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ON THE SPECIFICITY OF MIDDLE EASTERN CONSTITUTIONALISM

*

Chibli Mallat t
I. INTRODUCTION

Rend Maunier, a prolific French ethnologist and jurist (1887-195 1),
summed up in 1935 the radical transformation of Middle Eastern law since
the nineteenth century. In a brief report entitled Outline of the Progress of
Law in Muslim Land, he noted the centrality of law in the immense change
affecting the societies of North Africa that he knew: "Amongst the social
changes which can take place, one should put first legal changes. In Islamic
countries, there have been sometimes, over more than one hundred and fifty
years already, a transformation of legislation,and a transformation ofjurisdiction: new laws, new judges. This transformation (which was at times
evolution, at times revolution) is an important occurrence, which can busy
an investigator who is at once a jurist and a sociologist. Raraavis!"'
The sociologist, of course, is not the only social researcher concerned with the irruption of new laws and new judges in "the age of codification", 2 replete as it is with statutes and codes. Political scientists and students of "government" have been naturally concerned with the emergence
.

Presented at the "Rebuilding Nation Building" Symposium at Case Western Reserve
University School of Law, co-sponsored by the Frederick K. Cox International Law Center
and the Center for the Interdisciplinary Study of Conflict & Dispute Resolution, on Friday,
Apr. 8, 2005.
t Chibli Mallat is EU Jean Monnet Professor in European Law at Universitd St. Joseph,
Beirut, director of its Centre d'tudes sur I'Union Europdenne, and Senior Schell Fellow at
Yale Law School in 2005-2006. He is also an international legal practitioner, and the principal at Mallat Law Offices.
1 Jean-Robert Henry, Approches ethnologiques du droit musulman: l'apport de Reng
Maunier, in L'ENSEIGNEMENT DU DROIT MUSULMAN 168 (M. Flory & Jean-Robert Henry eds.,
1989) ("Parmi les changements sociaux qui peuvent avoir lieu, il faut placer, au premier
rang, les changements lgaux. Dans les pays d'Islam, il y a eu parfois, depuis dfjA cent cinquante ans, transformation de la ligislation, transformation de la juridiction: des statuts
nouveaux, des juges nouveaux. Cette transformation (qui fut tant6t 6volution, tant6t rdvolution) est un grand fait, qui pourrait occuper un enqurteur qui flit juriste et sociologue en
m~me temps. Rara avis!").
2 Chibli Mallat, From Islamic to Middle Eastern Law: A Restatement of the Field,52 AM.
J. COMP. L. 209, 285-86 (2004) (arguing that Islamic law went through three phases historically, the age ofshari'ain the first two centuries of the Revelation (622 C.E.), the age offiqh
(the classical age of the comprehensive treatises, from the ninth-tenth century to the sixteenth
century), and the age of qanun, which is the age of codification. Shari'a,fiqh, qanun, are all
terms translatable as law).
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of founding charters and constitutions in the new nation-states in the region.
If taught in the Middle East, an introductory course on constitutional law
would generally take the shape of a discussion of current constitutions and
constitutional models in the world, with an emphasis on the local or regional
constitutions, much in the way "droit constitutionnel" would have, until
recently, been taught in France. This will be our approach in the present
chapter. In an American setting, such a presentation would qualify under the
rubric of "government" or "political science". A course on constitutional
law taught in an American law school entails a very different type of discussion, which is centered on case law as developed over two centuries of constitutional review by the U.S. Supreme Court. The discrepancy between the
two modes of constitutional law study is qualitative. It also underlines the
passage to an American-style of constitutional review in the Middle East in
a slow but perceptible move away from the European tradition, at a time
when many European countries
have themselves been affected by the
3
"Americanization of the law."
The ignorance of constitutional review by Middle Eastern countries
is rooted in the process of colonization. Neither Britain, nor France until the
emergence of the Fifth Republic in 1958, was ready to accept judicial fetters
on Parliament's sovereignty. The Middle Eastern colonies did not know any
better. In a region where French legal education had prevailed in universities, and continues to dominate as far as the teaching method is concerned,
the model of the U.S. Supreme Court
was a remote and alien phenomenon.
4
Curricula and courts followed suit.

The absence until recently of constitutional councils and courts
means that there has been scant judicial review in the U.S. mode in any
Middle Eastern jurisdiction. Even in a common law country like Israel,
where the English legal model was influential and remains central to date, 5
3 See, e.g., CENTRE NATIONAL DE LA RECHERCHE SCIENTIFIQUE, L'AMERICANISATION DU
DROIT (Frangois Terri ed., 2001); Bruce Ackerman, The Rise of World Constitutionalism,83

VA. L. REV.771 (1997).
4 A cursive reading of the curricula of law schools in the Middle East shows the domina-

tion of western-style courses, with a few exceptions in countries such as Saudi Arabia. Even
in Saudi Arabia, the teaching of law with an insistence onfiqh does not really count as droit
positif.There are few monographs and articles on the subject of law schools. See generally,
Enid Hill, AI-Sanhuri and Islamic Law, in 10 CAIRO PAPERS IN SOCIAL SCIENCE 18-20 (1987)
(early law schools in modem Egypt); J. DUCRUET, LIVRE D'OR (1913-1993) DE LA FACULTt
DE DROIT, DE SCIENCES POLITIQUES ET tCONOMIQUES 7-64 (1995) (law schools in the modem
Lebanese state); DONALD MALCOLM REID, CAIRO UNIVERSITY AND THE MAKING OF MODERN
EGYPT (1990); BERNARD BOTIVEAU, LoI ISLAMIQUE ET DROIT DANS LES SOCIETES ARABES 167-

89(1993).
5 English decisions are quoted extensively by Israeli courts, and the Israeli bar continues
to recognize United Kingdom law degrees. See SHIMON SHETREET, JUSTICE IN ISRAEL: A
STUDY OF THE ISRAELI JUDICIARY (1994).
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judicial review always fell short of the judges' constitutional review of parliamentary statutes. In the absence of a constitution, there is in Israel no
"superior" text which can serve as a yardstick for ordinary laws, although
piecemeal "Basic Laws" with so-called "entrenched rights" have been introduced since the foundation of the state in 1948 to enlarge that writ. Still,
the legacy of the British concept of absolute Parliamentarian sovereignty
remains a marked feature of the Israeli system. This applied, mutatis mutandis until the 1980s, across the region. Only in Pakistan is it different, following the example of the neighboring Indian constitutional court, but the
turmoil of the Pakistani political system since independence in August 1947
has rendered that experiment relative and inconsistent.6
Against this weak tradition, the trend towards judicial review of
constitutions is strong across the Middle East, with the introduction of various models of constitutional review in the last decades in Egypt, Iran, and
the United Arab Emirates, and more recently in Yemen, Lebanon, Jordan,
Algeria, and Morocco.7
An analysis of Middle Eastern constitutional law is therefore possible on two levels. Following the French model, the analysis would examine
the political institutions of various states, the way elections are carried out,
the separation of powers if any, and the division of responsibilities between
executive and legislative powers in constitutional texts and in practice. The
system can therefore be studied from a top-bottom perspective, the way
constitutional law is usually taught in France ("gouvernants and gouvernjs"). This is the analytical course pursued here.
The other type of analysis follows a U.S. mode of exposition.
There, decisions of the courts are the focus of the analysis, in so far as they
shed cumulative light on the rule of law getting fleshed out in the practice of
judicial review understood largely, and in constitutional adjudication for
more recent experiments. Judicial review is the focus of a different study. 8
The same subject matter, constitutions and constitutional law, can
be appreciated therefore under these two different lights, which also correspond to a top-down as opposed to a bottom-up process. In addition to the
distinction between classical French constitutional law in its descriptive
exposition on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the U.S. discussion of
the Supreme Court's constitutional decisions (the U.S. law schools' Socratic
Method), a further distinction, this time between English law and U.S. law,
Martin Lau, Introduction to the Pakistani Legal System, with Special Reference to the
Law of Contract, in 1 YEARBOOK OF ISLAMIC AND MIDDLE EASTERN LAW 3-28 (E. Cotran &
C. Mallat eds., 1994). For further discussion, see Martin Lau's subsequent annual entries in
later volumes of the YEARBOOK OF ISLAMIC AND MIDDLE EASTERN LAW.
7 CHIBLI MALLAT, AN INTRODUCTION TO MIDDLE EASTERN LAW (forthcoming
2006)
6

[hereinafter MALLAT,
8 Id.

INTRODUCTION].
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helps appreciate the two different ways in which judicial review itself may
get carried out. When, as in the UK, a constitution does not nominally exist-for instance in Israel and Saudi Arabia, Middle Eastern judges must
resort to "ordinary" laws or to general principles of the law of the land.
More often a constitution does exist, but the courts have no constitutional
jurisdiction. This is the most common situation, which prevails in the
Maghreb, in the Levant, in Iraq, and in the Gulf. When they examine a case
which involves a "human right," judges cannot turn to the constitution
which usually enunciates it. In effect, the situation becomes similar to that
of countries without a constitution. Courts are limited to applying ordinary
law, generally administrative law as known in France or in the United
Kingdom.
Overall, Middle Eastern constitutional law has predominantly
followed the French "political science/government" model, and ignored
constitutional scrutiny in its American-and since 1949, German--form.
However, recent years have witnessed the timid but increasing allure of
constitutional review. This rise deserves a full, separate study,9 together
with the shape of "constitutional law" in Middle Eastern countries under the
English model of "judicial review" in their sub- or pre-constitutional nature.
One can then follow constitutional law in the Middle East in a traditional French-style manner, examining executive, legislative, and judicial
powers, their respective powers and interaction, and the way rulers get chosen (or not) to govern a country. While some of this traditional description
is inevitable, it may be more useful to underlie arguably specific Middle
Eastern themes. The present article examines accordingly contemporary
constitutional law under three headings, which determine a wide concept of
constitutional law from the point of view of gouvernants: (1) the shadow of
transjurisdictional unity and its failure; (2) the dominant ideological and
legal debate on the key concepts of constitutionalism, democracy, and Islam, often presented under the wide rubric "democracy and Islam (or sometimes other local religions and sects)"; and (3) the suggested summa divisio
between personal and territorial law. This is law-or political, institutional
power-as exercised from the top.
II. THE FAILURE OF TRANSNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS

However hazy, a Middle Eastern pattern exists, which, for particular historical reasons connected with colonialism and the fragmentation of
the area, needs some attention: the craving of people for a unity built on a
real or imagined Arab or Islamic commonwealth.

9 Id.
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Article 52 of the Charter of the United Nations favors the emergence of sub-regional groupings as a matter of principle.' 0 Such regional
grouping is hardly a yearning exclusive to the Middle East. Many countries
which appear less prone to integration have managed to create working regional subsystems the world over. In the one area which prides itself for a
centuries-old legacy of Arab-Muslim empires and offers in its rhetoric a
deep obsession with 'unity' against the fragmentation forced upon the region by modern colonialism, it is ironic that nearly all transnational endeavors have ended in failure. Still, the ebb and flow between nation-states' exclusive sovereignty and transnational models have considerably affected the
structure of the rule of law in the Middle East.
Through the historical domestic formation of each state, as well as
with regard to regional processes, constitutions in the 20th century Middle
East offer the figure of a tug-of-war between transnational integration and
the independent development of national institutions. Constitutional development of the region's legal systems can be followed along these two lines:
the separate growth of the twenty-five or so present independent countries
in the Middle East, and the complex and uncertain process of their integration or dismemberment or both.
While the political disenfranchisement of nation-states in the region
has generally unfolded in a similar process of colonization followed by independence, the legal constitutional development of Middle East systems
lay primarily in the specific and discrete legal and institutional construction
within each state. Owing to individual countries' separate national development, the region is more accurately approached jurisdiction by jurisdiction. This is also consistent with history: Algeria's colonization by France
for a hundred and thirty years means that the constitutional setting of independent Algeria was profoundly different from the process which took place
in neighboring Morocco, where the French protectorate (1906-1956) did not
seek to uproot the local ruler altogether. Mutatis mutandis, the mode of
colonization is different for every single jurisdiction. This is easily illustrated in the case of Algeria and Morocco when compared with the Gulf
States, especially Saudi Arabia and Iran, the only two countries that were
never formal colonies.

10 U.N. Charter, art. 52, paras. 1, 3 ("Nothing in the present Charter precludes the exis-

tence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action provided
that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and
Principles of the United Nations.... The Security Council shall encourage the development
of pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies either on the initiative of the states concerned or by reference from the Security Council.").

CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.

[Vol. 38:13

In parallel with developments prevalent in each individual jurisdiction, supra-state unity was pursued at various moments on the basis of geographic or national-religious commonality. This effort was pervasive in the
twentieth century Middle East, where the search for transnational unification operates on linguistic-ethnic (Arabic, Kurdish, Turkish-Turanian, etc.)
and religious (Muslim, Shi'i, Sunni...) factors, together with, on the opposite side, the rejection of the nation-state boundaries in favour of sometimes
smaller and allegedly more homogenous entities (Christian Maronites in
Lebanon; Berbers and Amazighs in Algeria; Kurds in Iraq, Syria, and Turkey; Kurds and Azeris in Iran, etc.).
In most instances, the institutional development within unchallenged boundaries has carried the day. Such is the situation of Morocco,
Algeria, Libya, Tunisia, Egypt, Mauritania, Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and
so far also Turkey and Iran. In some cases in contrast, the nation-state is
problematic, and the regional overtone dominant. This is evident in Lebanon and Palestine-Israel, where fragmentation did (or does) threaten the
unity of a given territory. Protracted civil strife tends to lead to de facto, if
not de jure, distinct entities. For instance, this is seen in the endemic civil
wars in Afghanistan and Sudan, in the Kurdish 'safe haven' established in
June 1991, which lasted until the reunification of Iraq in April 2003 when
Baghdad fell to American power, or in Somaliland as a break-away state
from war-ridden Somalia: all are cases in point of failed states resulting in
self-ruling, unstable sub-national entities. But regional considerations and
transnational yearnings also regularly push Middle Eastern governments to
attempt mergers on the basis of larger entities-with various degrees of
failure or success.
The interconnection between state development and regional integration is most clear in the case of the Arab-Israeli conflict. In September
1993, when the Israeli Prime Minister and the leader of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)-as the umbrella organization of Palestinian nationalism-initialed a first agreement in Washington, there already existed
in theory a Palestinian state, which had been proclaimed in November 1988
and officially recognised by over one hundred governments in the world.
However, the State of Palestine did not receive a strong enough recognition
to allow it to figure as such in the United Nations, nor did it have any territorial control over the part of Palestine which it purported to be located in,
and to which, in any case, the founders of the new state had not ascribed any
defined boundaries.
The Palestinian "entity" lacked the formal attributes of a normal
state until it came into some "territorial" being. As a consequence, even
though the Chairman of the PLO had put himself forward as the President of
the State of Palestine, there was no Palestinian government, and the rest of
the PLO institutions had retained a non-state character, with only shades of
diplomatic "embassy-status" in some friendly countries. This meant in
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terms of constitutional law a complex picture of a state-in-formation with
the hallmarks of a transitory and frail authority where institutions cannot be
recognised as similar to those of any other normal state. The Oslo Accords
altered the picture, transforming the 1988 Palestine state into a more real
hope, but its reality, a decade later, was still elusive. I'
This is not to say that there was no "constitutional" law for Palestine, or for Palestinians, before the Oslo Agreement and subsequent texts
came into being. One could distinguish a clear institutional Palestinian format under the umbrella of the Palestine Liberation Organisation, a "Basic
Law" of sorts under the name of the National Charter,' 2 and a "legislative"
body constituted by the Palestinian National Council (PNC). The PNC regrouped, from both the Palestinian diaspora and the Territories occupied by
Israel in 1967, the Palestinian notables who met and debated regularly.
The
13
PNC also elected an Executive Committee, headed by a Chairman.
Despite the formal recurrent Palestinian get-together, the split representation between Palestinians in the interior and Palestinians in exile
expressed the limited legislative role of the PNC. For the PNC, there was
never a question of issuing statutes for a homeland over which Palestinians
have no legal control. Yet, because of the in-built consensual process and a
relatively meaningful representation among the Palestinian constituencies
that the PLO had forged, the decisions of the Executive Committee of the
PLO were not tantamount to dead letter. There was a significant financial
power-although not strictly a budget-tightly held by the Executive
Committee's Chairman. There also was an important social and military
infrastructure, which was regulated by the semi-institutionalised consultations of the PLO organs, including "revolutionary courts" with a dubious
track record at various stages of military autonomy in and around the Palestinian camps of the diaspora.
This is the "domestic" side of the Palestinian state. But the internal
structure pales constitutionally into insignificance when compared with the
dominant regional process. The regional process, in turn, is only legal to a
limited extent. It has been determined, in the twentieth century, by a violent
struggle involving communities and armies whose technological and disciplinary cohesion allowed the Jewish colonies and, after 1948, the Israeli
11 See infra Part III. See generally THE
(Eugene Cotran & Chibli Mallat eds., 1996).
12

ARAB-ISRAELI ACCORDs: LEGAL PERSPECTIVES

See CHIBLI MALLAT, THE MIDDLE EAST INTO THE 21 ST CENTURY: THE JAPAN LECTURES

AND OTHER STUDIES ON THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT, THE GULF CRISIS AND POLITICAL ISLAM

61-66 (1996) [hereinafter MALLAT, 21 ST CENTURY] (discussing the Palestinian National Charter(s)).
13

See HELENA COBBAN, THE PALESTINIAN LIBERATION ORGANIZATION

See generally YEZID SAYIGH, ARMED STRUGGLE AND
PALESTINIAN NATIONAL MOVEMENT 1949-1993 (1997).

THE SEARCH

13 fig.1 (1984).
FOR STATE:
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state, to have the upper hand. On the legal level, the agreements and treaties
in the area, mainly the Camp David Accords of 1978 and the Oslo Accords
of 1993 and 1995,'4 offer an inroad into the influence of the law over the
states and peoples involved. It is in this context that the role of the Arab
League, as well as the various state coalitions in the area, also yields some
significance. The implications are evident for any Palestinian state, entity,
homeland, or regional formation which may emerge from the peace process,
with its roller-coaster hopes and failures. Meanwhile, the law for the majority of Palestinians in exile has been refugee law as administered by the
United Nations through a special agency called the United Nations Relief
and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), but
it is also a complex motley of laws in areas like the West Bank, where Israeli military decrees were superimposed on Jordanian and Ottoman law.
West Bank residues of Jordanian law are themselves composed of articles of
15
the Ottoman nineteenth century Majalla, classical Islamic law regulations
and state-of-emergency decrees dating from English domination, adapted
and renovated by Israeli military decrees. Hence the importance of16the regional framework for a definition of Palestinian 'constitutional' law.
The supra-state dimension may be glaring in the case of Palestine,
but it is also significant in almost all the Arab countries after independence.
Examples can be listed in the regional conflicts which have plagued the area
since the Second World War, the last and most spectacular occurring upon
the invasion of Kuwait and its annexation for seven months by Iraq between
August 1990 and March 1991.
The vanishing and re-emergence of the state in the case of Palestine
and Kuwait show the prevalence of regional considerations over internal
state formation. Another instance of the problem of the nation-state in the
Middle East, in contrast, suggests that the regional factor may act in a con14 S.C. Res. 1397, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1397 (Mar. 12, 2002). S.C. Res. 1515, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1515 (Nov. 19, 2003). See generally GEOFFREY R. WATSON, THE OSLO ACCORDS 37
(2000). The official title of the agreement between Egypt and Israel is the Egyptian-Israeli
Treaty. It was signed at Camp David in 1978. The so-called Oslo Accords stand for The
Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, signed in Washington
on September 13, 1993, known as Oslo 1, and the Israeli-Palestinian Agreement on the West
Bank and the Gaza Strip, signed in Washington on September 28, 1995, known as Oslo 2.
There were no further formal agreements as of 2005, despite various tentative accords, including two 'Taba agreements' soon after the so-called Second Intifada broke out on September 28, 2000. Security Council Resolutions 1397 and 1515 and international plans, especially by 'the Quartet,' established, or promised to establish, a Palestinian state.
15 See generally MICHAEL DUMPER, ISLAM AND ISRAEL: MUSLIM RELIGIOUS ENDOWMENTS
AND THE JEWISH STATE (1994) (providing an overview of waqfsystems).
16 See generally AL-SHAYBANI SOC'Y OF INT'L LAW LTD., THE PALESTINE YEARBOOK OF

INTERNATIONAL LAW. The Palestinian Yearbook of International Law is a major source of

scholarship and reference on Palestinian constitutional law. It has been edited since 1984 by
Anis F. Kassim, and subsequently by Camille Mansour.
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structive way. In 1990, for the first time since early colonisation two centuries ago, the two parts of Southwest Arabia known as the Yemen were
united. With the foundation of the Yemen Arab Republic in 1962 and the
independence of South Yemen in 1967, two different legal systems had
ruled the southern Popular Democratic Republic of Yemen and the northern
Arab Republic of Yemen. Their union in 1990 triggered a number of transitional steps, starting with the formation of a unified government under a
new constitution. From the inception of the politically united Yemen, the
difficulty in streamlining legal institutions was apparent, not only in commercial, civil, land, and criminal matters, with South Yemen coming out of
a socialist and collectivist system of laws, but also in other sensitive matters
such as family law and the structure of the judiciary. As the populations
merged, the family law of South Yemen, which was one of the more egalitarian Arab statutes in terms of women's rights, and the more traditional
family law of North Yemen, passed in 1984, needed to be unified both procedurally and in terms of substance. 17 Unification of the judiciary into a
single court system also meant that the looser, more informal and more
Zaidi-oriented Northern system had to accommodate a British-inspired hierarchical structure which prevailed, until the Union, in the Southern courts.
While operational for three years, unified Yemen fell prey to what proved to
be a trying merger of institutions. With the country in the throes of civil war
from April 27, 1994 to the fall of Aden in the hands of the Northern-based
army in June of that year, the collapse and refection of the Yemen illustrated, once again, the hazards of unity dreams. 18 The initially voluntary
merger was done by sheer force, and the question remains open on the longterm stability of the merged Yemen, but unity survived into the new century.
On the western side of the Arab world, the Grand Maghreb was declared in 1989, at the meeting in Marrakesh on February 17 of five heads of
state-Mauritania's, Morocco's, Algeria's, Libya's, and Tunisia's. Unlike
several previous attempts between various countries to move towards integration, the Treaty on the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) created formal institutions, including a Presidential Council with a six-month rotating head of
state, a Council of Foreign Affairs Ministers, a Consultative Council formed
Chibli Mallat, The Searchfor Equality in Middle Eastern Family Law, in AL-ABHATH
48-49, 7-63 (2000) [hereinafter Mallat, Family Law].
17
18

See generally BRINKLEY MESSICK, THE CALLIGRAPHIC STATE: TEXTUAL DOMINATION

AND HISTORY IN A MUSLIM SOCIETY (1993) (an elaborate work on law in the Yemen). On

Yemeni law generally, and other Middle Eastern and Arab jurisdictions, the annual entries in
THE YEARBOOK OF ISLAMIC AND MIDDLE EASTERN LAW (Eugene Cotran & Chibli Mallat eds.,
pre-1998 & Eugene Cotran & Martin Lau eds., 1998-2005) [hereinafter YEARBOOK] (offering
helpful points of legal entry in jurisdictions, some of which have little or no legal scholarship
available for study. Since its establishment in 1994, nine volumes have appeared.).
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by members of the respective Parliaments, as well as a committee of judges
drawn from each country to adjudicate potential litigation. This institutional
shell remains today, but the internal uncertainties plaguing the government
of each country, and the tendency for the leaderships to act outside the
frame of the AMU have not made the prospects of integration any closer
two decades into the AMU Treaty. With less than a fraction of the overall
economic exchange taking place in the Grand Maghreb despite the geographic contiguity of the five states, and the autocratic traditions prevailing
at the helm, the grand design and ideals of the heads of government could
hardly stand the test of time.1 9
A similar attempt can be found in the Gulf Cooperation Council
(GCC), and in the Arab Cooperation Council. The first of these two regional
formations, constituted in 1981 between Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United
Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Oman, and Qatar, was a response to the Iran-Iraq
war which had disrupted the stability of the Gulf region starting in September 1980. Despite the common institutions-a Supreme Council, a Ministerial Council, and a Secretariat, the fragility of the group was patent in the
inability of the GCC to defend Kuwait effectively, one of its member states,
against its legal obliteration by Iraq in August 1990. The second regional
group, created on January 16, 1989, between Iraq, Egypt, Jordan and North
Yemen, also fell victim to the quick pace of regional changes in the form of
the unity between North and South Yemen and the hiatus between Egypt
and Iraq after the invasion of Kuwait.
This striving for unity on a regional basis persists as a lasting magnet in the Middle East. Although this drive was more often than not defeated before the ink had dried on "the acts of unity," there are some significant instances where unity developed into real constitutional integration.
The first case occurred when Syria and Egypt merged in 1958 into the
United Arab Republic. The experience lasted two years and ended in total
disarray, but the two years saw significant, if not lasting, changes in the
constitutional set-up of the two countries, including the merger of Parliaments and the entrusting of executive leadership to one president.20
19

For annual entries on each country, see

YEARBOOK,

supra note 18, and

ANNUAIRE DE

L'AFRIQUE DU NORD (Eberhart Kienle ed., 2003) (published since 1962, this collection in-

cludes surveys with a strong public law content. A plethora of semi-official publications in
French and Arabic accompanied the declaration of the Grand Maghreb).
20

Comprehensive collection of constitutions in Arabic in

AL-DASATIR FIL-'ALAM AL-

'ARABI 1839-1987 567-570 (Constitutions in the Arab world, Yusif Quzma Khuri ed., 1988)
[hereinafter AL-DASATIR], in French in CONSTITUTIONS DES PAYS ARABES (Eric Canal-

Forgues ed., 2000) (providing useful introductions to each constitution); in English in
CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD

(Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz

eds., 1982). Unless otherwise specified, references hereinafter to articles in Arab constitutions can be found in these collections.

2006]

MIDDLE EASTERN CONSTITUTIONALISM

A more enduring enterprise of unity is that of the former Trucial
States of the Eastern Arab Peninsula. The United Arab Emirates ("UAE") is
a federation of the Emirates of Dubai, Sharjah, 'Ajman, Umm al-Quwayna,
Fujaira, Ras al-Khaima, and Abu Dhabi. 2 1 It was formed in 1971 and operates under a constitution (UAE Constitution) which was designed originally
for a period of five years, and which has since been extended periodically.
The greatest difficulty in the federal experience of the UAE consists in finding the right balance between the federal powers and the power of individual Emirates; it was agreed that even though the major issues were to be
decided by the Federation, each Emirate could legislate until the matter
would be covered by UAE federal law. The Emirates retained in this way
the significant residual legislative role not specifically granted to the Federation by the constitution.
The deciding body of last resort in the UAE is the Supreme Council, which is formed by the Rulers of each Emirate and their deputies. It
establishes UAE policy, decrees laws, and is entrusted with ultimate decision-making for the Federation on the basis of majority vote, but Abu Dhabi
and Dubai retain a veto power because of their greater importance as the
richest and most populated Emirates in the Federation. The Supreme Council appoints, from amongst its own members, the President and the VicePresident of the UAE, who are in charge of issuing union laws after the consultation of the Council of Ministers, in turn appointed by the President. The
President is also the Chairman of the Supreme Council.
Alongside the President, the Supreme Council, and the Council of
Ministers, a National Federal Council is in theory responsible for passing
laws. In fact, the forty members of the Council are not elected, and their role
as appointees of the Rulers is predominantly consultative. The legislative
process is therefore in the hands of the Rulers and, by delegation, the Council of Ministers. Article 110 of the UAE Constitution stipulates that a bill
becomes law after 'preparation' by the Council of Ministers, which submits
it to the approval of the Supreme Council and the President.2 2 In theory the
bill should also receive the agreement of the National Federal Council

21

See generally ROSEMARIE SAID ZAHLAN, THE MAKING OF THE MODERN GULF STATES

(1998). See generally UNITED ARAB EMIRATES COURT OF CASSATION JUDGMENTS

1998 - 2003 (Richard Price & Essam Al Tamimi eds., 2005) and UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
COURT OF CASSATION JUDGMENTS, 1989-1997 (Richard Price & Essam Al Tamimi eds.,

1998) for a rare publication of collective decisions of the United Arab Emirates appellate
courts.
22 See AL-DASATIR, supra note 20. Article 110 of the Provisional Constitution of the
United Arab Emirates, "AI-dustur al-mu'aqqat li-dawlat al-imarat al-'arabiyya almuttahida." THE PROVISIONAL CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES art. 110.
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which can be dispensed with if the bill is ratified by the President after approval by the Supreme Council.23
The Federation allows for a distinctive limitation of powers by the
individual Emirates, including control over their natural resources, taxation,
and police. In 1981, Article 142 of the UAE Constitution was amended by
the Supreme Council in order to strengthen federal power by restricting the
right to levy the army to federal authorities. The leeway left to the local
rulers for the regulation of their own affairs tends to slowly give way to
federal power, with part of the oil revenues going into the federal budget
which is drafted by the Council of Ministers and approved by the Supreme
Council.
Although it is clear from the constitutional set-up of the state that
the main separation of powers derives from the traditional autonomy of the
local rulers, the UAE represents the only working federation in the Middle
East. It depends in practice on a mode of consensus amongst the individual
rulers, rather than on the democratic interplay between institutions, and renders the federal arrangements fragile. The experiment is nonetheless exceptional, since other regional integration attempts have all ended in failure.
The most telling example of the failed attempts at Arab integration
is the Arab League,2 4 founded in Cairo in the wake of the Second World
War. The Arab League is neither a unitary nor a federal system. As a loose
confederation, it lacks central political authority, and the decisions it takes
are reached on the basis of unanimity. The treaty establishing the Arab
League was signed by Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan on March 22, 1945. The Arab League defined its objectives generally as
better cooperation among the Arab countries and the defence of their common interests. With more Arab countries acquiring independence, the
League grew in size and importance, and has often acted as a mediating
body in the conflicts between Member States. It occasionally plays a role in
the relations between Member States and the outside world-such as the
European Union, but it has tended to be mostly active in the confrontation
between the Arab world and Israel. Badly bruised after the expulsion of
Egypt from its midst in the wake of the Camp David Accords in 1979, it
took the Arab League ten years to create a new fagade of Arab unity, only
for the 1990 invasion of Kuwait by Iraq to signal the swan song of its efficiency.
Yet the Arab League did play the role of a cultural and social focus
enhancing regional exchange, including in the field of law. This was done
through two means: in the first place, the Arab League's Secretary-General
arts. 110, cls.3 & 4.
See AL-DASATIR, supra note 20, at 125-127 (Founding Charter (mithaq) of 1945:

23 THE PROVISIONAL CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES,
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"Jami'at al-duwal al-'arabiyya").

2006]

MIDDLE EASTERN CONSTITUTIONALISM

retains a role not dissimilar to the United Nations Secretary-General in the
world system. He is chosen for a renewable period of five years by twothirds of the Member States' representatives. Although his functions are not
specified with any precision, he has acted as the Arab League spokesman in
time of consensus, as well as a mediator between states in conflict. The decisions of the Arab League's Council are implemented through him and the
Arab League offices; the Council itself is formed by representatives of the
Member States, who meet irregularly, sometimes at summit level. The second regional focus of the Arab League lies in the various treaties and suborganisations that it has spawned since its establishment. In 1950, a "common defence and economic cooperation" treaty was entered into as a way to
institutionalise military and economic councils. It has remained a blank letter. Many other Arab organisations saw the light, such as the Arab Postal
Union (1954), the Arab Bank for Development (1959), the Arab Financial
Institute (1961), the Arab Common Market (1964), the Arab Federation for
Tourism (1965), though all are equally ineffective. There are specialized
offices which tend to be more useful than the "organisations," like the Institute of Arab Manuscripts, which has managed to coordinate efforts in a
marginal area, and the Anti-Israel Boycott Office which issues guidelines
for legislation that bear some of the hallmarks of a "federal" legislation. For
example, standard international business contracts in Arab countries have
included, until the peace treaties with Israel, a clause which renders the contract void if the non-Arab party has a manufacturing branch in Israel. However, in the absence of a controlling body, which never materialised despite
the repeated talk about an Arab Court of Justice, it was left for each State to
issue the regulations and to implement commonly agreed boycott policies.
In practice, legal integration at the level of such Arab institutions has been
haphazard, poor, and inefficient.
Less official but practically more significant inter-Arab organisations were professionally based. To date, such bodies as the Union of Arab
Writers and the Union of Arab Lawyers can be viewed as lasting, if not particularly successful region-wide professional organizations. Although the
world of politics has dominated their irregular meetings, joint work was
possible on a professional basis, occasionally resulting in comparative legislative drafts. A case in point is the Draft Personal Status Law issued in 1986
by the common endeavour of the Arab Ministers of Justice.25 While it is not
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The Project for a Unified Arab Code of Personal Status, Mashru' qanun 'arabimu-

wahhad lil-ahwal al-shakhsiyya, 'agreed' in final form in 1986, was some ten years in the
making. It appears, together with a detailed commentary in the form of preparatory works, in
2 AL-MAJALLA AL-'ARABIYYA LIL-FIQH WAL-WADA' 11-43, 43-265 (1985) (providing the text
and the preparatory works respectively). The Code is presented and discussed in the article
on family law, see Mallat, Family Law, supra note 17.
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likely to be implemented in the near future, it offers a meaningful example
of the persistent search for regional legislative convergence.
On the whole, the Arab League was unable to transcend its image of
an inefficient parleying forum to become a real federative unit. On the economic level in particular, where some progress was expected pace the European model, the Arab Common Market has proved a failure. Although there
is significant labour and business traffic between Arab states due to deep
family and cultural ties, the bulk of the exchange has taken place between
each Arab country and the industrialised world, and it is notable that a visa
for many Arabs to visit, or work in, other Arab countries, is much harder to
obtain than a similar permission for European or Asian citizens. On the
wider level, after the Camp David accords and the isolation of Egypt, the
headquarters of the Arab League were transferred from Cairo to Tunis. Only
after Egypt went back to the Arab fold in the late 1980s was pressure reinitiated to bring the headquarters back to Cairo. The move was completed
in late 1990. But the occupation of Kuwait in the summer of 1990 showed
in dramatic fashion the limitations of the Arab League's powers, with the
Secretary-General tendering his resignation before the incapacity of the
organisation to solve the problems it was set up to face. Despite talk about
amending Article 7 of the Charter of 1945 to change decision-taking from
consensus to qualified majority as in recent treaty developments in Europe,
the mere opposition of a single state remains sufficient to cripple the Arab
League institutions.
What about federation efforts through Islamic, in contrast to Arab,
common values? Inefficient as the Arab League may have been in terms of
rendering the legal systems of the Middle East more cohesive, the parallel
efforts introduced on the level of Islamic integration have faltered even
more patently. In the first place, integration through Islam is a much wider
enterprise, and is more difficult to fathom in a practical manner than under
the label of Arabism. Arab countries tend to be more cohesive and better
defined than "Muslim" or "Islamic" countries, and offer a geographical and
linguistic continuum: the Arab world spans, in the formula of the advocates
of Arab unity, the region stretching "from the Ocean Atlantic to the Gulf'.
In contrast, Muslim countries are more numerous-the Muslim population
in the world is approximately 1 to 1.2 billion, compared to some 280 million
Arabs, and Muslim countries are geographically far apart. Unity of the Muslim world would have to include Indonesia, Nigeria, Iran, and Albania,
since all these countries count more than eighty percent Muslim citizens,
but Islam has not yet proved able to offer sufficient economic and legal
common ground for a privileged cooperation between them. Furthermore,
there are sizeable Muslim minorities in Europe, Africa, Asia, including the
former states of the Soviet Union, China, and South Africa, and increasingly

2006]

MIDDLE EASTERN CONSTITUTIONALISM

articulate Muslim communities in Europe demanding that aspects of Islamic
law be taken more seriously into account by the national legislatures.26 The
unity of the Muslim world seems even harder to achieve than the elusive
search for Arab integration.
Notwithstanding these disparities between Muslim countries, the
rise of Islam as a political phenomenon in the 1980s has been matched by
an increase in the demand for the application of the shari'a world-wide. Yet
the aspiration towards greater Islamic unity has been organisationally poor.
The Islamic Conference, which included fifty-two states at the Casablanca
Summit in December 1994, fifty-five states at the Tehran Summit of December 1997, and fifty-six states in the first decade of the 21st century,27
meets irregularly, and its decisions are taken even less seriously than the
Arab League's.
This does not mean that the Islamic legacy is an insignificant feature in the legal process of Middle East countries. But its international dimension has been mooted on the legal level since the heyday of the Islamic
Revolution in Iran, in contrast with its political prominence. True, the Constitution of Iran itself stipulates in its Preamble that Islamic solidarity would
be pursued world-wide, and one can find in the operation of the Saudi State
the desire to organise Islamically on the world level-e.g. in the works of
the Islamic World League, based in Jeddah, 28 not to mention long-standing
pan-Islamic claims of leaders such as Egypt's Naser or Libya's Qadhdhafi.
Still, the impact of Islam has been restricted to the domestic level in legal
practice.
Since September 11, 2001, the nature of the confrontation has taken
a global course, but this operates mostly on a political rather than legal
level. I have argued elsewhere that there are forms of legal internationalism
in Islam based on the classical Shi'i system of the marja'iyya, whereby a
lay Shi'i is bound to follow his or her leader (the marja 3 irrespective of
nationality or boundaries. Chosen freely amongst a number of prominent
legal authorities by every Shi'i individual, the marja' becomes in effect a
binding legal reference for Shi'is across the world, if his followers are sig26

See, e.g. LE STATUT PERSONNEL DES MUSULMANS: DROIT COMPAR-t ET DROIT

INTERNATIONAL PRIVt (Jean-Yves Carlier & Michel Verwilgen eds., 1992); See also Europe,
in ISLAMIC FAMILY LAW 119 (C. Mallat & J. Connors eds., 1990) (including chapters by

Bernard Berkovits, Sebastian Poulter, Riva Kastoryano, and Dima Abdulrahim).
27 The Organization of the Islamic Conference (Munazzamat al-mu 'tamar al-islami),
http://www.oic-oci.org (last visited Feb. 2, 2005) (indicating establishment in Morocco, 1969
and Charter adopted, 1972). See also SAAD S. KHAN, REASSERTING INTERNATIONAL ISLAM: A
Focus ON THE ORGANIZATION OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE AND OTHER ISLAMIC
INSTITUTIONS (2001).
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nificant enough for him to become the dominant "supreme" leader. 29 On the
Sunni side of the divide, there is little doubt that an "international Sunni"
has developed around al-Qa'eda, but the organisation is secretive and lacks
state support since the rapid collapse of Taliban rule in Afghanistan in October 2001. Unlike the structured institutions of the Shi'i marja'iyya, there
is little "law" in the international Sunni, but the planetary scope of Qa'edarelated violence raises pressing questions about the international dimension
of Islamic law also in its Sunni dimension. Here, explicit references in modem constitutions discussed next may be less telling than the deeper constitutional structure which we examine in a final section. But explicit references
are also important, which operate in an uneasy matrix composed of the
shari'a, constitutionalism and democracy.
III. ISLAMIC LAW, CONSTITUTIONALISM, DEMOCRACY
Muslim advocates of democracy often quote those verses in the
Qur'an in which God demands from the believers to decide their affairs by a
process of consultation-shura. 30 Supportive examples are adduced from
the first Caliphs' process of selection-the bay'a 31-and various aphorisms
on the intrinsic freedoms of the individual, notably Caliph 'Umar admonishing "the unacceptability of putting fetters on people whose mothers created
free.",32 Handy as the aphorisms may be, they can be countered by other
sayings and realities of "Oriental despotism,' ' 33 as in the image of the

sword-wielder standing behind The Thousand and One Nights sultan to execute his master's "off-with-their-head" commands.3 4 On balance, the textual
tradition is probably more supportive of the values of justice and freedomas would be expected in any world religion. A lawyer can and will make the
point, however, on whatever evidence he or she can find, blowing an aphorism out of its original proportion and away from context to fit the case at
29

See CHIBLI MALLAT, THE RENEWAL OF ISLAMIC LAW: MUHAMMAD BAQER AS-SADR,

NAJAF AND THE SHI'I INTERNATIONAL 27-107 (1993)

[hereinafter MALLAT, RENEWAL]. See

also MALLAT, 21 ST CENTURY, supra note 12, at 127-172.
30 QUR'AN 42: 36, 3: 53 enjoining 'politics by consultation' (al-amrshura baynakum). See

Roy Mottahedeh, Consultation and the PoliticalProcess in the Islamic Middle East of the
9th, 10th, and in 11th Centuries, in ISLAM AND PUBLIC LAW: CLASSICAL AND CONTEMPORARY
STUDIES 19 (Chibli Mallat ed., 1993) for an early historical context of shura.
31 See Chibli Mallat, Introduction: On Islam and Democracy, in ISLAM AND PUBLIC LAW:
CLASSICAL AND CONTEMPORARY STUDIES (Chibli Mallat ed., 1993) (discussing the early
historical concept of bay'a).
32
See WAJDI MALLAT, MAWAQEF - POSITIONS 23-25 (2005) for other similar references.
33 See KARL A. WITTFOGEL, ORIENTAL DESPOTISM: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF TOTAL
POWER (1957).
34 Despite the received notion, the image of the sayyaf (the 'sword-wielder' standing behind the ruler to execute his orders on the unfortunate soul who might have antagonised him)
in The Thousand and One Nights is not dominant. He appears only in a few stories.
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hand. In a less cynical rendering of lawyerly opportunism, it is a healthy and
normal feature for societies to keep rediscovering their past traditions, in
order to adapt them to their preferred vision of immediate reality. The process of discovery is never neutral. As value-bound by the present, the modem
interpreter will consciously or unconsciously undertake surgical interventions in the past to feed on immediate and pressing demands.
From the professional historian's more detached perspective, anachronisms for or against "the compatibility between Islam and democracy" or
"between constitutionalism and Islam" cannot be too useful. The original
shura and bay'a are only vague cousins of the corresponding consultation
and election processes of the modem age. Slavery is a universal medieval
feature, which in some Middle Eastern countries continued well into the
twentieth century, and talk of freedom in such context is per force faulty.
Yet freedom is a strongly rooted concept, 35 and there is a palpable civil society at work in classical Islam, if by civil society one understands organisations and people whose activity is not directed by the state.36 In classical
Islam, professions, a merchant bourgeoisie, and an active judiciary in various forms-judges, muftis, and law scholars-offer a reality which is
clearly autonomous from the state, and qualifies naturally as civil society.
Equal justice before the law and the presence of individual rights suffuse the
Islamic legal tradition. To that extent, the modem Middle East may have
ignored precious forms of proto-democratic balancing in favor of raw and
arbitrary state power.
As for the problem of Islamic law being prevented from change because it is God's law-as the political expression of the "closing the gate of
ijtihad", the issue has been for all societies, including those professing allegiance to Islam, a matter of "the ultimate interpreter." In this context present
crises surrounding democracy tend to get befuddled. The problem is not so
much the issue of whether man or God makes the law, but which of the
many competing men, and more rarely women, are empowered to interpret
it.
35
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CENTURY (1960) (providing a critical treatment of this idea).
36 See John Donohue, Individualisme, corporatismeet Etat: oi4 se trouve la civilit dans la

socigti civile au Moyen Orient?, in 65 TRAVAUX ET JOURS 161 (2000) (discussing civil society in the Arab world, and referencing cites for classic and modem times). See also Chibli
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ed., 1993); and Chibli Mallat, Renforcer la Socit Civile contre 'Etat: Horizons du travail
international au Proche et Moyen Orient,commentaire sur le Rapport de la Banque
Mondiale sur la Gouvernance au Proche et Moyen Orient (Nov. 21, 2003), available at
http://www.worldbank.org.
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On a modem historical timeline, developments towards a democratic polity did not come much later to the core of the Islamic world-the
Middle East-than to most European countries. The three major blocs
which had some room for manoeuvre, the Ottoman Empire, Iran, and Egypt,
featured prominent reformist ideas throughout the nineteenth century. The
movement known as constitutionalism had so matured by the beginning of
the twentieth century that radical changes were attempted in each of these
three blocs to bring about a founding charter resembling a social contract.
Room for maneuver is critical here, and it is no surprise that the process did
not develop in that direction in North Africa, where colonisation was keen
to prevent any form of indigenous political representation threatening the
Frenchness of Algeria and neighbouring countries, and that it was scuttled
in Lord Cromer's Egypt. Where some democratization went ahead in practice, in 1908 in the Ottoman Empire, from 1905 to 1909 in Iran, Islam was
used by the reformists to great effect. Na'ini, an Iraqi faqih of Iranian descent who died in 1936, wrote a treatise on the virtues of constitutionalism
as the 1905-1909 constitutional revolution was unfolding, 37 and the Constantinople Majlis-e Mab'uthan (Parliament of the Emissaries) featured between 1908 and the First World War the first elected proto-federal parliament in the Middle East, which included Ottoman subjects from present-day
Turkey, Syria, Iraq, Israel-Palestine, and Saudi Arabia.38 On a comparative
timeline, federal and democratic developments came only a few years after
the establishment of the Third Republic in France and are contemporaneous
of brief interwar parliamentary experiments in Germany and Italy. They
precede similar constitutional developments in Spain.
Then came all-out war in Palestine. War is a great distorter. Democracy and human rights in times of war tend to remain frozen, as in the case
of the U.S. citizens of Japanese descent who were interned during the Second World War, with the blessing of the U.S. Supreme Court, or more recently, as in internments with little due legal process of "Arab suspects" in
the UK in the early run-up to the Gulf War, anticipating in turn the "black
legal hole" of Guantanamo Bay prison.39 Much more than for Europe and
37 See ABDUL-HADI HAIRI, SHI'ISM AND CONSTITUTIONALISM IN IRAN (1977) (providing
information on MUHAMMAD HUSAIN NA'INI, TANBIH AL-UMMAH WA TANZIH AL-MILLAH

(1906), which was published in Najaf circa 1906 and reprinted in the 1960s through the care
of Ayat Allah Mahmud Taleqani, one of the leaders of the Islamic Revolution of 1979).
38 The minutes of that Parliament are available, and the present debate on federalism in the
Middle East will gain much from their serious study by scholars. See pioneering work by
KHALED BARAZI, THE MAJLIS MEBUSAN (MECLIS-I MEBUSAN): THE OTTOMAN PARLIAMENT

(2002) (Ph.D Thesis, London University).
39 See Colonel Gordon Risius, Prisonersof War in the UnitedKingdom, in THE GULF WAR
1990-91 IN INTERNATIONAL AND ENGLISH LAW 289 (Peter Rowe ed., 1993); Bernadette
Walsh, Detention and Deportationof Foreign Nationals in the United Kingdom During the
Gulf Conflict, in THE GULF WAR 1990-91 IN INTERNATIONAL AND ENGLISH LAW 289 (Peter
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the United States, the problem of interfering wars has been endemic in the
twentieth century Muslim world. First came colonialism, which will remain
a troubling episode of raw domination in humanity's modem course, dovetailing with a First World War which was itself very colonial. When the
killing frenzy stopped, the call for parliaments and freedom was loud and
clear, without an exception, across the region.40 Again, such calls for independent representation did not curry much favour with Britain and France,
the main winners of the spoils, for whom the rule of law was only worth
pursuing if defined within the scope of their own unchallenged dominance;
and in the case of Britain, one should always remember that a whole people
was uprooted from their land in Palestine under British control.
For indigenous liberal movements, of which the Egyptian party alWafd offered in between the two world wars the paragon of an outspoken
and well-structured liberal-democratic party for the whole Middle East, as
well as the most attentive one to the necessity of fair and free representation, distaste for violence meant a long and drawn out conflict. British
stonewalling prevented it from yielding decisive fruit in time before the
onset of the Second World War and the subsequent emergence of the Palestine conflicts. The self-determination transition to democracy, unlike India,
was scuttled, and the Palestinian-Israeli wars acted, in turn, to radicalise
extremism heralded in authoritarian regimes, many of which were still in
place several decades after the coups that brought them to power.
Within these historical constraints, a synchronic perspective of the
sundry forms of the "constitutional law" in the Middle East can be presented in a brief typology of the constitutional-political systems as they
function at the turn of the 2 1st century in the area, with a focus on the role of
Islamic law, or democracy, or both, as the background to an increasingly
central debate. This is typically an exercise in constitutional law in its
French traditional form.
Rowe ed., 1993); See also A v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, [2004] UKHL 56 (lowering the standard of proof for the accused in "terrorism" acts but rejecting any "legal black
hole" that the terrorism phenomenon may create, where no proper judicial review is possible); Rehman v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, [2001] UKHL 47; Rasul v. Bush, 542
U.S. 446 (2004). See also Johan Steyn, Lord, House of Lords, Guantanamo Bay: The Legal
Black Hole, Remarks at Twenty-Seventh F.A. Mann Lecture (Nov. 25, 2003) (transcript on
file with author); Owen Fiss, Sterling Professor of Law, Yale Univ., The War Against Terrorism and the Rule of Law, Remarks at Oxford University: H.L.A. Hart Memorial Lecture
in Jurisprudence and Moral Philosophy (May 10, 2005) (transcript on file with author); Some
of the most proficient material was put together in, Global constitutionalism: Nationhood,
Same-sex marriage, at Yale Law School Global Constitutionalism Seminar, Part iii (Sept. 2124, 2005); See also Chibli Mallat, The OriginalSin: "Terrorism " or "Crime againsthumanity "?, 34 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 245 (2002).
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Several studies have appeared in recent years, offering an overview
of the political-constitutional systems of Arab and Middle Eastern countries. 4 1 Whilst political studies inevitably devote some attention to historical
processes at large, historians have also developed syntheses on political and
constitutional developments, and the two approaches converge significantly.42
Rather than repeat or summarise this French-style constitutional exercise with the description of the various institutions in each state and their
respective operations and competence, we propose to look more closely at
the incorporation of Islam as a differentiating factor in the constitutional
framework of the Middle East.
Islam figures in the majority of the constitutions and founding texts
of Middle Eastern States, and most Arab countries have a reference to Islam
in their constitutions. The Islamic Republic of Mauritania and the Islamic
Republic of Iran carry the reference in their official appellation as states. In
other countries, Islam is consecrated as the official religion. In others yet,
the Muslim affiliation of the Head of State is required.43
Although cosmetic in some cases, the Islamic reference is patent
overall. Its reassertion in constitutional law was comforted by the rise of
revolutionary Islam in Iran and elsewhere. A famous amendment to Article
2 of Egypt's constitution in 1980 stipulated, for example, that the "shari'a
would be "the"-as opposed to the previous "a"-sole source of legislation
in the country." 44 This opened up the debate over the exclusive or pervasive
role of the shari'a in the system. The controversy over Article 2 remains,
especially over such significant issues as riba and interest in the financial
and civil system. In countries like Egypt or Pakistan, executive and judicial
41
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(Maurice Flory & Robert Mantran eds., 1968) (providing classic compendia in English and French respectively).
42 See, e.g., MALCOLM YAPP, THE NEAR EAST SINCE THE FIRST WORLD WAR: A HISTORY
RGIMES POLITIQUES DES PAYS ARABES

TO 1995 (1996); ALBERT HOURANI, A HISTORY OF THE ARAB PEOPLES (1991); IRA M.
LAPIDUS, A HISTORY OF ISLAMIC SOCIETIES (2d ed. 2002) (discussing the deeper historical
period covering the whole world of Islam); BERNARD LEWIS, THE MIDDLE EAST: A BRIEF
HISTORY OF THE LAST 2,000 YEARS (1995). See also NATHAN J. BROWN, THE RULE OF LAW IN
THE ARAB WORLD: COURTS IN EGYPT AND THE GULF (1997) and NATHAN J. BROWN,
CONSTITUTIONS IN A NONCONSTITUTIONAL WORLD: ARAB BASIC LAWS AND THE PROSPECTS
FOR ACCOUNTABLE GOVERNMENT (2002) (discussing political science and law in the contem-

porary Middle East).
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efforts of the Courts to prevent the supremacy of Islamic law from
overflowing the totality of the financial system have not been decisive,
despite a 1992 decision of the Federal Shariat Court of Pakistan that deemed
the whole banking system to stand in contradiction with the requirement,
under Article 227 of the Pakistani Constitution, to conform with the shari'a.
The issue
has been pending since then before the Pakistani Supreme
45
Court.

In the Sudan, the shari'a is the single most divisive constitutional
issue in a country where the Southern population is in its majority not
Muslim. The introduction and implementation of strict shari'a criminal
legislation in 1983, with the cutting of the thief's hand and executions for
"apostasy, ' ' 6 led to the deposition of the country's autocratic leader, but
subsequent governments continue to face a deadlock which has persisted for
decades.
It is perhaps in Iran that the greatest juristic effort was exerted towards introducing Islamic law in its allegedly pristine form at all levels of
the State. The constitutional experience of post-revolutionary Iran is mitigated, and the system was not running so smoothly as to avoid the numerous Amendments introduced to the text only ten years after its adoption in
1979. Still, partly because of the relative openness of the domestic debate in
contrast to Arab countries, the constitutional experiment of Iran remains one
of the most alluring in the region.
The Iranian constitution was elaborated under the concept of
wilayat al-faqih (velayat-e faqih in Persian), or the governance of the jurist(s). This theory was adumbrated by Ruhullah al-Khumaini back in 1970
and developed in the 1979 writings of the Iraqi scholar Muhammad Baqer
al-Sadr, who was executed by the Ba'th regime a year later. It was introduced in the Iranian constitution that year by an adaptation of the deeprooted Shi'i institution of the marja'iyya: we have seen that the mara'iyya
vests the elaboration of the law in the most knowledgeable jurists in the
Shi'i world, who in the tradition are known as marja' (plural maraje',reference) and act as source of emulation.47 As the best experts in the law, the
Chibli Mallat, Commercial Law in the Middle East: Between Classical Transactions
and Modern Business, 48 AM. J. COMP. L. 81, 124-29 (2000) (discussing the decision on riba
41
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ing the 1985 execution of opponent Mahmud Taha by Nimeiry). See also CAROLYN FLUEHRLOBBAN, ISLAMIC LAW AND SOCIETY IN THE SUDAN (1987) (discussing the early forced introduction of Islam to the Sudan).
47 Emulation, taqlid. The maraje' are known today in Iran as Ayatollahs (in Arabic and
Persian, Ayat Allah, literally "sign" or "verse of God"). See generally RoY MOTTAHEDEH,
THE MANTLE OF THE PROPHET: RELIGION AND POLITICS IN IRAN (1985) (discussing and offering conclusions on the Iranian revolution which are still valid today); see also SHAUL
BAKHASH, THE REIGN OF THE AYATOLLAHS: IRAN AND THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION (1984).
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jurists are, in the system, entrusted with protecting the Islamic nature of the
state. This is reflected in Article 5 and Article 107 of the Iranian Constitution, which vest the ultimate constitutional decision with the "supreme"
jurist in the country, the leader or guide,4 8 a position held by Khumaini until
his death in 1989, and taken on after him by a man he effectively appointed
to the job after dismissing another "leader" who turned out to be averse to
his version of what the Islamic revolution should be.49
In another form, the dominance of the jurist is manifest in the
Council of Guardians, which examines the conformity of each law passed
by Parliament with the shari'a and with the Constitution. In effect, the
Council of Guardians has turned to be such a powerful organ in the first
decade of the Constitution that its role was curtailed in the 1989 Amendments by the creation of a political body overarching the Council-the Majma'-e Tashkhis-e Maslahat-e Nezam, the Council for the determination of
the nation's interest, whose role is to solve the recurrent conflicts between
the Council of Guardians and Parliament.5 °
But the dominance of the jurist as expert in Islamic law is not total
in the system, for there are a number of other institutions which are similar
to Western constitutional models. Mention was made of the Iranian Parliament, but there is also a President who is voted in by universal direct suffrage. Against direct representation, the screening role of the supreme jurist-the "leader", as well as that of the jurists of the Council of Guardians,
is typical of a country in search of safeguards and self-perpetuation for its
ruling group of clerics. The problem with the Council vetting candidates to
both Parliament and presidency is fundamental, leading in a succession of
elections to a generally meaningless contest between "conservative" and
"progressive" supporters of the mullahs' leadership.
The Iranian set-up, whose toned-down parallels can be found in
Pakistan and Egypt, offers the most concrete Islamic challenge to classical
constitutionalism in the Middle East by allowing the judiciary - the Islamic
jurists of the Shi'i tradition - a key role as ultimate interpreter of the constitution.
On the other side of the Islamic spectrum of explicit reference to
Islam in a country's constitutional system stands the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia. A monarchy that has systematically rejected the principle of
In Persian, rahbar.
See MALLAT, RENEWAL, supra note 29, at 89-91, 104-107; MALLAT, 21ST CENTURY,
supra note 12, at 129-32 (discussing the leadership between Khumaini, Muntaziri, and
Khamene'i).
50 See MALLAT, RENEWAL, supra note 29, at 89-107, 146-57; see also MALLAT, 21ST
CENTURY, supra note 12, at 143-47 (discussing the constitutional crisis leading to the emergence of the Majma').
48

49
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representative elections, 5' Saudi Arabia offers a marked contrast to its
Persian neighbour across the Gulf. The antagonism between the two
countries shows the wide variety allowed under the concept of an Islamic
state. Saudi Arabia prides itself so much on being an unadulterated Islamic
system in its following of the theses of Wahhabi Hanbalism that it refuses to
adopt a Constitution. For Saudi rulers, "the Qur'an is the constitution," and
the whole institutional set-up is but a derivative of the Qur'an. This is
confirmed in the first article of the Basic Law of 1992: 52"The state's
constitution is the Book of God and the sunna of the Prophet.,
Beyond the overall reference to the Qur'an, how is Islamic Saudi
Arabia governed, and how is Islamic law featured in it? There is little doubt
that the persona of the King and of the immediate Sa'ud family concentrate
the most significant legislative and executive powers in the Kingdom. Such
control was not always that tight, Article 5 of the 1926 Fundamental Law of
the Hijaz, the Western part of Saudi Arabia, which was joined by conquest
to the Najd central area in the 1920s, states that "His Majesty is bound by
the rules of the shari'a.53 No separation of powers was recognised in government until the basic laws introduced in March 1992. An explicit recognition was then acknowledged for the first time, resulting first in the establishment of a "consultative assembly, the Majlis al-Shura. 54 The Majlis was
originally composed of a president and 60 members whom the King chooses
among persons of knowledge and experience. 55 Article 44 offers potentially
the most significant change in the system with a limited set of reforms: it
acknowledges the principle of the separation of powers: "the powers in the
state are56 composed of judicial power, executive power, and legislative
power.
"' Abdulaziz H. AI-Fahad, Ornamental Constitutionalism: The Saudi Basic Law of Governance, 30 YALE J. INT'L L. 375, 375 (2005) (quoting King Fahd, "The system of free elections is not suitable to our country, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia"). Limited elections were
conducted in 2005 on the municipal level. No democratic breakthrough resulted. There are
also recurring elections to the Jeddah chamber of commerce; in 2005, for the first time,
women could be elected to these positions.
52
The Basic Law of Governance (Nazam al-hukm), Royal Order A/90 (Mar. 1, 1992)
[hereinafter Basic Law of Governance] was decreed by King Fahd on March 28, 1992, together with two other laws, the Law on the Consultative Assembly (Nazam majlis al-shura)
[hereinafter Consultative Assembly], Royal Order A/91 (Mar. 1, 1992), and the Law of Provinces (Nazam al-manatiq),Royal Order A/92 (Mar. 1, 1992) [hereinafter Law of Provinces];
The texts of each are available as separate booklets on file with the author. They are also
availableat http://www.saudiembassy.net (follow "About Saudi Arabia" hyperlink; then
follow "Laws" hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 2, 2005).
53 See AL-DASATIR, supra note 20, at 148-50.
54 For the remainder of this piece the Majlis al-Shura will be referred to as "Majlis".
55 Consultative Assembly, supra note 52, art. 3.
56 Basic Law of Governance, supra note 52, art. 44. The Arabic term for "legislative" used
here is tanzimi which is unusual. In other Arab countries, the word used is tashri'i.
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However, even this "revolutionary" recognition is undermined by a
qualification introduced, in the same article, to the effect that "the King is
the marja' of these powers. ' 7 The word marja' (literally reference) used in
Arabic is unexpected for Hanbalis, as it is steeped in the Shi'i tradition of
the marja'iyya, but the neologism carries enough respectability across the
modem Arab world to make its use alluring to the Saudi rulers. Notwithstanding the haziness of the concept in a Saudi context and the ambiguity in
the relationship of the King to these three powers because of the difficulty
to define what a marja' is, any uncertainty is soon removed. The Majlis
may, if requested by ten or more members, initiate bills or propose amendments to existing ones. This proposal is transmitted to the Chairman of the
Majlis, who may pass it on to the King.5 8 The King decides what to do with
the proposal and there is no recourse against him. Legislation remains
clearly the prerogative of the Council of Ministers under the presidency of
the King. Should any doubt persist, the Majlis's legislative competence is
further defined as the voicing by the Majlis of its opinion in the general
policies of the state which are passed onto him by the Prime Minister, 59 who
stands for the King. According to the first President of the Majlis, Muhammad ibn Jubayr, these powers entail "the examination of the laws 60 which
the wali al-amr, literally the person in charge, that is the King, will issue,
before these laws are promulgated.", 61 In effect, the power of the Council of
Ministers is discretionary. The government chooses the laws it may submit
to the opinion of the Majlis al-shura, and all the necessary safety valves to
avoid any significant power of the Majlis at the expense of the King can be
found in the key areas of basic laws: discretionary appointment by the King
of all the members of the Majlis, no financial power for the Majlis, no right
for the deputies to deliberate in public, and a residual right to initiate legislation, but not to approve or vet it.
As a result, legislative and executive powers operate in terms of a
division of labour that confers on the King and his family dominant legislative fiat, through decrees, and sole executive power. Forms of supervision
and consultation are retained to accommodate a first tier of religious jurists,
notably the descendants of the Wahhabis, and, increasingly, the prominent
merchant and business families and the growing educated tier of technocrats. This larger process of consultation was formalized in 1992 in the es-
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id.

58

Consultative Assembly, supra note 52, art. 23.

Id. art. 15.
In Arabic anzima. This word is usually used in Saudi Arabia for decrees and laws alike,
including codes.
'9

60
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Interview,

AL-MAJALLA AL-'ARABIYYA

(Feb. 24, 1993).
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tablishment of an Assembly which gives some public prominence and recognition to the larger Saudi public, but no executive power.
The 1992 Basic Law of Governance states that the system of governance in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is a monarchy.6 2 The veneer of
"constitutional reform" notwithstanding, the King, who has now shed all
other titles to don the more simple and evocative "Protector of the Two
Holy Places (Mecca and Madina), 63 rules much as absolute monarchs did
in the medieval period. Insofar as there are no constraining constitutional
texts outside his allegiance to the Qur'an, the monarch is absolute and the
system is self-perpetuating. The King appoints during his life a successor
"from amongst the sons of the founder King Abdulaziz" 64 (the appointee is
not necessarily a descendant) who, in turn, is confirmed in power by the
citizens 65 when the King dies, under the process of bay'a. Since there is no
formal mechanism for the bay'a, any popular confirmation or rejection remains theoretical.
The King in effect embodies all executive, legislative, and judicial
powers in Saudi Arabia. Any autonomous power operates on the basis of the
monarch's right to delegate. In 1953, a royal decree instituted for the first
time a Council of Ministers directed by the Crown Prince. The Council of
Ministers responds exclusively to the King, who remains its official head.
Of note is the fact that the concentration of formal powers in the hands of
the King has been reinforced under the 1992 "constitutional" arrangements.
Delegation operates vertically, through the Council of Ministers, the various
Ministries, and the bureaucracy. Delegation also operates horizontally, with
the King appointing a number of representatives from amongst the ruling
66
family to head the various administrative regions in the vast Kingdom.
Here again, the new law on the regions introduced in 1992 did not present
any tangible break with the previous regime, and members of the Sa'ud
family directly man the direction of regions as Emirs.
In this constellation of predominantly authoritarian texts, the riches
of Islamic law as surveyed elsewhere do not appear as a source of inspiration for the system in any noticeable way.67 But the shari'aresurfaces on a
number of levels other than the personal devotion of the King and his ap-
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Basic Law of Governance, supra note 52, art. 5.
In Arabic, hami al-haramayn.

6

Id. Note that this provision's precedent appeared in the 1876 Ottoman Constitution. THE
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OTrOMAN CONSTITUTION.
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In Arabic, muwatinun; Consultative Assembly, supra note 52, art. 6.
This arrangement is now provided for under the second "basic law" enacted in March

1992, the Law of Provinces, or manatiq. Law of Provinces, supra note 52.
67 See Chibli Mallat, From Islamic to Middle Eastern Law: A Restatement of the Field
(Part1), 51 AM. J. COMp. L. 699 (2003); Chibli Mallat, From Islamic to Middle EasternLaw:
A Restatement of the Field (PartII), 52 AM. J. COMP. L. 209 (2004).
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pointees. In part, conformity with the tradition derives from conservative
Puritanism rooted in Wahhabism, both a legal and theological tradition. It is
within the tribal system that the protection of the Islamic values lato sensu
operates. Alongside the increasingly powerful bureaucracy, and sometimes
despite it, the Saudi tribes follow their own traditions, which are arguably
Islamic, with at the head of each tribe a shaykh, whose connection with, and
influence on, the ruling family, depends on a number of factors including
historical allegiance and the size and centrality of the tribe. 68 In criminal law
for instance, the old system of blood money (diyya) which is typical of
tribal justice, and whose roots go back in time at least until the Prophet, has
remained a manifestation of the continuing blending of tribal customs and
Islamic law, as well as a further example of the persistence of an ancient
Middle Eastern legal pattern.
More formally, Islamic law is protected by the presence of the
'ulama, the jurists, in sensitive ministries such as education and justice, as
well as in the judiciary. Even where, as in commercial law, Western inroads
have been made on a large scale, lip-service allegiance to the shari'a remains patent, and is encountered at all tiers of the system.
For Islamic law in Saudi Arabia, the problem, however, is that there
may not be as much of it as would be desirable. The Islamic legal tradition
offers a great wealth of layers which, together, constitute a deep and sophisticated system of the law in Islam. Because of a tradition of secrecy in public affairs, which has been reinforced for a long time by the financial compensations which the state uses to soothe its citizens and secure their silence, Saudi law is an elusive world: notwithstanding some recent efforts to
regulate the profession, there is no acknowledgment by the government of
lawyering as profession, and no bar association. 69 Saudi lawyers, who number no more than a few hundred in a population of 15 million, are mainly
dedicated to disputes over wealthy state procurement contracts, generally
with foreign companies which find it difficult to operate without a specific
set of legal rules and enlist the support of legal counsel to navigate in the
bureaucratic maze. Counsel is essentially restricted to matters of commercial law and foreign investment. In family law disputes, which are adjudi68

See Alexander Bligh, The Saudi Religious Elite (Ulama) as Participantin the Political

System of the Kingdom, in 17 INT'L J. MIDDLE E. STUD. 37 (1985) (discussing the understudied aspect of Saudi Arabia of tribes and "ulama"). See also Hermann Frederick Eilts, Traditionalism Versus Modernism: A Royal Dilemma?, in IDEOLOGY AND POWER IN THE MIDDLE
EAST (Peter J. Chelkowski & Robert J. Pranger eds., 1988); NATANA J. DELONG-BAS,
WAHHABI ISLAM: FROM REVIVAL AND REFORM TO GLOBAL JIHAD (2004); MAI YAMANI,
CRADLE OF ISLAM: THE HUAZ AND THE QUEST FOR AN ARABIAN IDENTITY (2004); MADAWI
AL-RASHEED, A HISTORY OF SAUDI ARABIA (2002).
69 See, e.g., Hussam Salah Hejailan, Saudi Arabia, in 7 YEARBOOK OF ISLAMIC AND
MIDDLE EASTERN LAW 271, 275 (Eugene Cotran & Chibli Mallat eds., 2000) (explaining that
efforts to bring order to the professions have had mixed outcomes).
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cated by loosely regulated tribunals, and even in criminal law, where the
writ of courts is limited as the prosecution has a wide and purposefully imprecise competence which includes sentencing, lawyers are not welcome.
The most important court in the Kingdom is Diwan al-Mazalim,
which is also exceptional in so far as some of its decisions have been published.7 ° Since 1989, the Diwan has also been competent to hear commercial
cases, and there is a strange right of appeal to the Diwan al-Mazalim from
within the Diwan al-Mazalim. In the absence of reports, little can be known
about the work of other courts, and even the Diwan al-Mazalim has stopped
publishing its decisions.
This problem of secrecy vis-a-vis the law can be seen in the poor
quality of the official journal, Umm al-Qura, which brings together laws
and statutes, news bulletins on the most trivial activities of the main
dignitaries, as well as announcements of tenders and of religious
conversions. Yet, together with those decisions of the Diwan al-Mazalim
that have seen the light, Umm al-Quraoffers to the lawyer and legal scholar
a contemporary source material which sheds useful light on the operation of
law in Saudi Arabia. A skeletal official journal, and a bar on a system of law
reporting do not allow much leeway to justice seen to be done. A telling
example on the constraints of law as can be fathomed in the secretive
Kingdom appears in the constraints put on the deliberation of the 60-strong
members of the new Majlis (enlarged--or watered down-since to 150).
The members are "forbidden, under any condition whatsoever, from
carrying with them outside the Majlis any papers or laws or documents
which relate to their work." 7 '

70

The collection on the decisions of Diwan al-Mazalem on file with the author consists of

seven volumes, all published by the secretariat of the Diwan. It includes Majmu'at almabade' al-shar'iyyawal-nizamiyya, four volumes covering the period 1397-1399 (197779), 1400 (two volumes), and 1401. This series, which features full decision, includes miscellaneous administrative disputes. The second series includes criminal decisions and comprises three volumes. It is entitled Majmu 'at al-qararatal-jaza 'iyya, part one on qadaya altazwir in 1400, part two on qadaya al-rashwa wa muqata'at isra'il,also in 1400 (1980). A
third volume also covers qadaya al-rashwa wal-tazwir for 1401. These hefty compendia
yield much information on the rule of law in Saudi Arabia during the short period they cover.
Their value is made all the more remarkable by the fact that the Diwan discontinued publication of its decisions after that period. No published decisions are available in typical criminal
law cases or from family courts. Even death sentences are not published.
71 Article 14 of the Ia'iha dakhiliyya (internal organization) of the Majlis (on file with the
author); the 1992 Basic Laws have generated much interest, but the studies, including ours
here, tend to be more descriptive than analytical. This should not be surprising considering
the secrecy of the Kingdom's politics. See generally A. M. Tarazi, Saudi Arabia's New Basic
Laws: The Strugglefor ParticipatoryIslamic Government, 34 HARV. INT'L L. J. 258 (1993)
and AI-Fahad, supra note 51 (arguing that although the limited changes may be empty, they
are at least "frank").
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Across the Arabian Gulf, one therefore witnesses two conspicuously different Islamic constitutional traditions, both proud of their respect
for Islamic law and its pervasive application. In Saudi Arabia, the dominance of a rigid monarchical system allows for various forms of informal
consultation, but, unlike Republican Iran, a representational process in the
shape of elections is all but absent. Despite this significant difference, the
self-portrayal of government as Islamic is dominant in both countries.
On the other side of the Middle Eastern constitutional world, in
countries like Turkey, Israel, and Lebanon, the main reference in the system
is to democracy. This is also the case in the slow move away from absolutism in Jordan and in Morocco, operating in fits and starts under the pressure
of society and the patronising whims of occasionally enlightened monarchs.
In Turkey, the democratic process has been haphazardly applied
since the end of the Second World War, but the past two decades offer a
consistent attempt at the protection of constitutional normalcy after a long
spate of military coups, including a remarkable Muslim-Democratic
experience since the access to power of the Islam-style Refah party in the
early 21st century.7 2 In Israel, where freedom of expression generally goes
unchallenged, the democratic process has been vitiated by the domination of
large, unrepresented Arab populations in the 1967 Occupied Territories,
coming on the heels of a pattern of ethnic cleansing now firmly documented
by historical research. Within Israel proper, a two-tier structure of
citizenship segregating Arab Israelis from their Jewish counterparts also
undermines the democratic character of the system, both in terms of lawsegregation against Arabs in naturalisation, land ownership, and military
service-and in effective governmental participation.73 All these negative
72
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of political science and history on both Turkey and Israel that remains the classic work on the
passage in a book from the Ottoman Empire to the modem Republic of Turkey. See also
HALIL INALCIK, THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE: THE CLASSICAL AGE 1300-1600 (Norman Itzkowitz
& Colin Imber trans., 1973) and STANFORD J. SHAW & EZEL KURAL SHAW, HISTORY OF THE
OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND MODERN TURKEY: VOL. II: REFORM, REVOLUTION, AND REPUBLIC
(1977) for comprehensive introductions to the Ottoman period; ANDREW MANGO, THE TURKS

TODAY (2004) for overviews of recent Turkish history; Soli Ozel, Turkey at the Polls: After
the Tsunami, 14 J. DEMOCRACY 80 (2003) for a discussion of Turkey's strenuous efforts
towards electoral stability; WILLIAM HALE, TURKISH POLITICS AND THE MILITARY (1994) for
an analysis of the military's role in modem Turkey; YORAM PERI, BETWEEN BATTLES AND
BALLOTS: ISRAELI MILITARY IN POLITICS (1983) for a study of the role of the Israeli military;
BARUCH KIMMERLING, THE INVENTION AND DECLINE OF ISRAELINESS: STATE, SOCIETY, AND
THE MILITARY (2001) for a sociological study on modem Israel; BARUCH KIMMERLING,
ZIONISM AND TERRITORY: THE SOCIO-TERRITORIAL DIMENSIONS OF ZIONIST POLITICS (1983).
73 See DAVID KRETZMER, THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE ARABS IN ISRAEL (1990) and DAVID
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elements are in a constant state of flux against free elections and an
independent judiciary which marks a significant repository of basic
individual freedoms and rights for the Jewish part of the population.
If formal democracy as understood in Western legal literature can
be defined as the combination, over a period of time, of freedom of expression and association and the recurrence of representative elections for the
whole population, it has also been upheld with some consistency in Lebanon between 1943 and the outbreak of the civil war in 1975.
The Lebanese Constitution was elaborated in 1926 whilst the country was under French mandate. Much of the original text did not survive
independence in 1943, but the overall presidential and parliamentarian
structures and the separation of powers were retained. Until the 1975 breakdown in civil and regional wars, the Lebanese institutional configuration
was a combination of the 1926 Constitution and an oral, customary agreement between leaders of the Christian and Muslim Communities in the socalled "National Pact" of 1943.
The essential features of this combination can be summed up in the
way Article 95 of the original Lebanese Constitution has been interpreted
from 1943 until its amendment in 1990. Article 95 stated: "As a temporary
measure, and for the sake of justice and concord, the communities shall be
equitably represented in public employment and in the composition of the
Cabinet, such measure, however, not causing prejudice to the general welfare of the State. 74 The various euphemisms in this "provisional" text have
meant that the representation of the religious communities at all levels of
public employment, from the President down to the lowest echelons, had to
follow a specific communitarian power-sharing formula. At the top of the
state structure, this formula is exemplified in the requirement that the three
most important positions in the country, those of President, Prime Minister,
and Speaker, be respectively allotted to the exclusive appointment of a
Christian Maronite, a Muslim Sunni, and a Muslim Shi'i. Following a similar formula, the number of deputies in Parliament was calculated on the
basis of a multiple of a 6 to 5 ratio of Christians to Muslims. Accordingly,
out of 99 Members of Parliament, 54 were Christian and 45 were Muslim.
Within the Christian group, 30 were Maronites, with the remaining 24 MPs
divided across several smaller Christian communities. On the Muslim side,
electoral law assigned 20 Sunni, 19 Shi'i, and 6 Druze posts.
The combination of regional turmoil, internal demographic changes,
and political leaders' incompetence destroyed the delicate democratic experience in 1975. After a protracted civil war marked by regional and international interference, the constitutional balance was altered in 1989 in the
Accords named after the Saudi city of Ta'if, where they were first agreed. In
74 THE LEBANESE CONSTITUTION art.

95;

AL-DASATIR, supra note

20, at 438-44.
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September 1990, the Ta'if Accords were implemented in various amendments to the original Lebanese Constitution.
In essence, the religious-based "consociational" democracy prevailing until 1975 remains typical of Lebanese "democracy". In the post-Ta'if
system, a slight decrease in Presidential powers in favour of a collective
Cabinet role and an equal balance in a now 128-strong Parliament between
Christian and Muslim deputies constitute the most important alterations, but
the main hallmarks of pre-war Lebanon have been retained in a milder and
more palatable form. A crucial test of the reestablishment of democracy
appeared in the planned conduct of new elections under the Accords, but the
occasion for the country to be back on firm democratic tracks was scuttled
in the summer of 1992, which saw poor Christian participation and the rise
of Syrian power, with thousands of troops remaining in the country despite
an explicit clause in Ta'if requesting their withdrawal from Beirut and most
Lebanese coastal cities. There was more participation in the elections of
1996, but the process was marred by irregularities, leading to the resignation
of the president of the newly established Constitutional Council in April
1997." The 2000 elections saw a surprise victory of a loose opposition, but
it was only after the shockwave occasioned by the brutal assassination of
the former Prime Minister on February 14, 2005, that the so-called Cedar
Revolution succeeded, together with international pressure, to force the Syrian troops out.
Between the "Islamic" systems in Saudi Arabia and Iran, and the
incomplete democratic experiments in Lebanon, Morocco, Jordan, Turkey,
and Israel, range a number of authoritarian regimes which the Iraqi system
typified until the fall of its three-decade long dictator in April 2003. The
Constitution of Iraq is a good example of the way fundamental laws can be
shaped to accommodate the authoritarianism of a regime. At the heart of the
system is the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), and the head of the
RCC is effectively the highest power in the Republic. From 1979 until his
downfall, Saddam Hussein held that position, as well as those of Army
Commander-in-Chief, Prime Minister, and leader of the Ba'th party; adding
in a 1994 reshuffle that of Prime Minister Of all the Middle Eastern countries, Iraq probably held the most negative record in human rights violations
and the centralisation of all authority under a single ruler. Mutatis mutandis,
the same is true of Libya and Syria, and, to lesser degrees all the Arab countries that followed the Naser "constitutional RCC model." This model, established in Egypt informally by the 1952 "free officers" coup, was constitutionalised in a combination of military/unique party leadership (the Revo75 See 3 THE YEARBOOK OF ISLAMIC AND MIDDLE EASTERN LAW 221, 221-227 (Eugene
Cotran & Chibli Mallat eds., 1996) (referencing and describing the process of the 1997 crisis).
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lutionary Command Council) across the self-labelled parliamentary regimes
in the region, with variations from Mauritania to Pakistan, including Algeria, Tunisia, Sudan, the "PLO state", and Eritrea. All these countries followed the core model established in Egypt and adopted by Iraq in increasingly authoritarian fashion since 1959, by Libya wholeheartedly in 1969,
and by Syria determinedly since 1970.76
The picture is not uniformly dark, however, and the region has
witnessed a significant though inconclusive push towards democratic
openings. Some elections have allowed for serious competition among
candidates in an atmosphere of open debate, and the free and unadulterated
exercise by the population at large of its right to vote. In the elections of
Northern Iraq in May 1992, which were made possible by the so-called
"safe haven" imposed on Baghdad in the wake of its defeat in the second
Gulf War, seven parties were competing for a Kurdish assembly under a
new electoral law. 77 In unified Yemen, the elections of April 1993 were held
in an atmosphere which was remarkable for a country whose rate of
illiteracy is staggering. More significantly, experiments of Turkey and Israel
have reaffirmed, respectively, a rooted if intermittent practice, and an
unblemished regularity. In the case of Israel, this regularity has been marred
by the long-term occupation of the West Bank, the Golan and Gaza, and by
too slow a disenfranchisement of the Arab citizens of Israel proper, who
represent some eighteen to twenty percent of the population of the Jewish
state.
Part of this openness has come from a general drive towards democracy in the world as a whole, compared to which the Middle East has trailed
behind. On balance, constitutionalism as embodied in free and regular political consultations has taken the pattern of a seesaw, as in Egypt, Tunisia,
and Jordan, with authoritarianism regaining the upperhand in more brutal
manner. In some cases like Algeria, democratisation was boldly introduced
in 1990-1991, only to produce a backlash which has brought violence in
unprecedented fashion since the war of independence between 1956 and
1961. Other systems have failed to offer more than cosmetic reforms, and
all share the dwarfing of constitutional attempts by the rulers' adroit combi76
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nation of Western fear of extreme Islamic militant groups, who tend to snub
democracy as a Western ploy which is incompatible with Islam, and the
persistence of regional crises which offer easy excuses to the regimes in
place not to move further towards democracy. But electoral democracy remains conspicuously high on the Middle Eastern agenda, and appears impressive in some instances, like the Kurdish elections in Northern Iraq in
May 1992, the Yemeni elections of April 1993, and the January 2005 elections in Iraq. Peaceful street moments in Lebanon and elsewhere started in
2005, which combined with the yearning for free elections and change at the
top to express democratic popular hope, but the experiment has not yet been
decisive for the countries involved.
Democracy, of course, cannot be limited to a one-time electoral
consultation, and in the fragile systems across the region, elections are
meaningless if they are not recurrent. The civil wars which raged inside the
Kurdish safe haven and in the Yemen in 1994 are powerful reminders of the
difficult nature of the search for the rule of law across the Middle East in
terms of political representation.
If war and the colonial West distorted the nascent liberal movements between the First and the Second World Wars, a period when Islamic
ideology was generally on board the process of liberation/selfrepresentation, there were also strong voices within the Islamic movement
against democracy as a Western, and hence "bad" product. But even then,
attention to detail is needed. When the dissenting Islamic voices came
forcefully to the fore in the shape of the Khumainist revolution in 19781979 Iran, they had been adumbrated in Khumaini's lectures in Najaf in
1970 in a political, not in a constitutional garb. There, Khumaini's hatred
for the West was rooted in the bitterness of many Iranians towards United
States policy, which supported the Shah's despotism in return for cheap oil
and extraterritorial jurisdiction for its citizens. In a pamphlet essentially
directed at the frustration before what he perceived as the hypocritical onslaught of U.S. power, Khumaini's "Islamic" argument was never against
parliaments, or elections. The Iranian Majlis flourished after the Revolution,
even if any public debate remained heavily constrained by the principle of
the marja "s constitutional dominance and the vetting power massively used
by the Council of Guardians in both parliamentary and presidential elections. 78
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This should leave us with the acknowledgement that the zero-sum
debate on incompatibility or compatibility between Islam and democracyoften interchangeable with "the West"--will remain active and unanswered
for some time, until at least some of the political dust settles and a stable
political and economic course is reached in one or more Middle Eastern
countries. Meanwhile, the real questions on both sides of the Islam-West
divide need to be defined with more precision.
The argument must first steer clear of any quintessential compatibility, because more sophisticated indices of the political-constitutional process are required to assess Middle Eastern constitutionalism in its relation to
Islam. These indicators could be grouped into three core areas: electoral
processes and alternation in power, civil society, and the courts. Since politics develop primarily on a national basis, each Middle Eastern country
must be examined through those three prisms.
The first indicator concerns the existence and effectiveness of Parliament, and the recurrence of free elections to determine alternation in the
leadership: thanks to parliamentarian life, Turkey and Yemen have shown
themselves in the past quarter of a century to be more democratic than
Ba'thist Iraq, and Iran is a far more lively place of public debate than Saudi
Arabia or the United Arab Emirates.
Whether elections allow for a stable democracy hinges on the fact
of their recurrence. The case of Algeria is the most dramatic in recent years,
as the point was not so much to have elections, but how to create the
conditions for them to recur as a matter of course. Any assessment of the
"best conditions" for recurrence of elections involves an array of
international and domestic legal considerations which have developed
around the elusive concept of "a new international order" in the wake of the
Gulf War. Since the Middle East is a natural candidate for realignments of
potentially significant reach, the analysis requires attention, on both the
domestic and regional levels, to the complex picture which is slowly
emerging in Iraq, in Palestine, the neighbouring Levant countries, and in
North Africa. This question will no doubt see significant developments for
mechanisms which are needed to ensure that a group coming to power is
constrained enough not to think that democracy equals free elections, but
free recurrent elections.
A related central element for stability emerging from the electoral
processes revolves around what should be the natural result of the voting
exercise: the right to choose one's ruler, which entails the right to end the
ruler's mandate. Trite as this consideration may be, it is particularly dramatic in the Middle East where the countries whose supreme ruler changes
in the electoral process are the exception rather than the rule. In the past
decades, this was the case for only a handful of systems, which included
Israel, for its Jewish population; Lebanon, with one short and one long civil
war, in addition to being interrupted with the prorogation of the mandate of
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an incumbent president in October 1995, and interrupted again in September
2004; Turkey and Pakistan, with several military coups interludes. In all
other countries, the supreme ruler dies in office, is killed, or flees into exile.
A peaceful, orderly change at the top following a model defined by the rule
of law is an exception which is for the moment limited to Israel, and to a
lesser extent to Pakistan and Turkey. Across the rest of the region, there is
not one example of orderly alternation at the helm.
Second, there is civil society at large: the parties, the press, the trade
unions, the associations. Again, the quality of democratic life depends on
the variety and strength of these organisations.
Saudi Arabia offers an example on one extreme side of the spectrum of "civil society" organizations. In the tribal Kingdom, where secrecy
is of the essence, television dishes appeared in the mid-1990s as a formidable opening to uncensored information. In addition to a systematic purchase
of controlling shares in any Arabic-speaking cable or satellite station, and
the ownership of major international Arab newspapers published in London,
the Saudi government followed in March 1994 the Iranian example by forbidding dishes and satellite television. 79 All communication runs, under a
law which is technically inapplicable, under a centralised cable system.
This is a faint example of government and civil society being at
odds, and it is difficult to see how sustainable such intellectual impoverishment can be. A state cannot give its people good education and expect them
not to be ambitious or want to learn more, and government control is always
a fax or an electronic mail message behind. In Iran itself, the story of the
dissemination of Ayatollah Khumaini's speeches and sermons in 1977 and
1978 on audio cassettes is well known, and London-based Saudi and Bahraini oppositional groups have made systematic use of the internet, after a
heavy use of faxes, to introduce their messages at home.
One could venture that civil society will eventually take care of the
problem of censorship and constraints on various freedoms, as the people
tend to be, on the long term, more inventive than the governments that
straitjacket them as a matter of principle, more often than not in the name of
religion. But governments can also be remarkably dogged in preventing the
growth of civil society, and will pursue muzzling the press, imposing censorship, jailing dissidents, and preventing political and trade union groups
from making an impact on the public scene. As a matter of course, human
rights reports tend to be a long catalogue of governmental abuses against
constantly re-emerging voices of dissent. The widespread turmoil affecting
at the turn of the twenty-first century the domestic scene in all countries-
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without exception-suggests that the battle between governments and civil
societies is joined.80
A related and final question is about the existence and power of
courts: Is there an independent judiciary? Does this judiciary have a
constitutional writ? How effective is it? The effective protection of human
rights depends on the answer to this question. As for the courts, to which
too little attention has been so far paid, the historical tradition of a respected
judiciary in classical Islam should have triggered some concern for reviving
and strengthening the judiciary. In Iraq under Hussein or Libya under
Qadhdhafi, the writ of the courts does not go beyond the judge's desk. In
Saudi Arabia, sections of the judiciary have triggered some respect when
they were allowed public coverage, but the banning of law-reporting for the
highest court is expressive of the absoluteness sought by the monarch. In
Egypt, the system depends on the respect that the Executive is ready to
entrust a judiciary which survived both Naser and Sadat. The effectiveness
of courts is at the heart of the rule of law, and the Middle East is no
exception to a universal need. Case-law and courts deserve a fuller, separate
treatment.8 '
IV. A DEEPER CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE? PERSONAL V. TERRITORIAL
LAW

Whatever the transnational appeal on Arab, Muslim, or other
ethnically or religiously defined constituent groups, we have seen that all
countries in the modem Muslim world have adopted constitutions or basic
laws, including the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 1992. For comparative
public law, more telling than the discussion of the explicit "reference to
Islam in the constitutional text" is the Westphalian model of nation-states as
a contrastive "territorial model" to what we can describe as the "personal
model." Under the personal model, law adheres to the person as a member
of a given religious sect rather than to her belonging, as a citizen, to a
nationally defined territory.
The system of nation-states is well-entrenched in all Muslim countries with sizeable Muslim populations; this is a fact of the twentieth century. Another fact is that the nation-state straitjacket does not operate well.
In his Summa on Mediterranean society as seen from the Cairo Geniza
documents of the 10th-13th centuries, Samuel Goitein provides archival
evidence to the historical depth of a dysfunctional structure: "At the root of
all this was the concept that law was personal and not territorial. An individual was judged according to the law of his religious community, or even
80
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or sect, rather than that of the territory in which he hapreligious "school"
82
pened to be.",

Compare this to Rend Maunier's passage from his 1935 report
quoted at the beginning of this chapter, on the "effects of the transformation
of law." After noting "the gains of written law over customary law, with the
emergence of Codes in Muslim land," Maunier describes the second most
important characteristic to be "the gains made by territorial law over
personal law." 83
Confronted with the failure of democratic constitutionalism both in
terms of working transnational institutions and domestic arrangements, one
should therefore wonder whether the difficulty does not lie in deeper historical structures outlined, in the same society a thousand years apart, by our
two scholars.
While fashionable after Samuel Huntington's Clash of Civilizations,84 inwhich the fault line between Islamic and Western civilizations
emerges as the defining paradigm of the international scene, any grand approach requires an initial caveat: the comparison between the West and Islam is uneven by nature, especially for lawyers. A depiction of a clash between two world patterns may have its merits, but the image breaks down in
the many nuances and precisions needed for a comprehensive and accurate
picture. "Civilization" is a fleeting concept. Islam is a religion, and several
countries with a Muslim majority seem to have little in common despite
sharing the same religion. Tunisia, Nigeria, and Indonesia hardly appear as
a common legal bloc. Similarly, "Western civilization" is rarely defined in
terms of religion, however much the concept of a "Judeo-Christian culture"
is stretched since Nietzsche's devastating critique in Beyond Good and
Evil8 5 and Genealogy of Morals.86 On the world scene, the dominant legal
subject remains the nation-state.
So the modem nation-state is eminently territorial, including in the
Middle East: within one's boundaries vests a legal system which is by definition exclusive of any other. All citizens in the state are bound by that system, and they become bound by the next door system as soon as they cross
the international boundary.
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Here is perhaps the historical fault line identified already in
Goitein's works on 10th to 13th century Egypt. In the received world of
Islamic law, this is illustrated in the divide made by classical lawyers between dar al-harb and dar al-silm or dar al-islam, the war territory as opposed to the peace-Islam territory. 87 The distinction forces a relation onto
the law which tends to be far more strongly personal than it is territorial.
The citizen carries under the divide her or his religious attachment to the
law wherever he or she goes: while this is not completely unknown to an
American or a French national, who may be bound for instance by fiscal
laws of her country irrespective of territory, personal law is not the dominant relation outside one's country in a Westphalian system. It is in an Islamic one.
This sort of generalisation may be facile, with examples or counterexamples strengthening or weakening assumptions that the theory may render unnecessarily rigid. Still, one component is decisive, which grounds the
issue of personality versus territoriality of laws in a special mould of a typical Middle Eastern constitutional system and arguably beyond, in Pakistan,
India, Malaysia, and now Europe because of emerging, self-defining Muslim communities. This mould is at the root of the difficulty present nationstates in the Middle East confront for the future of their people.
The pre-Westphalian dimension of the debate can be brought into a
more philosophical perspective. John Rawls addressed precisely the issue of
democracy and religion in one of his latest works by giving the example "of
Catholics and Protestants in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries when
the principle of toleration was honored only as a modus vivendi. This meant
that should either party fully gain its way it would impose its own religious
doctrine as the sole admissible faith.",88 In this case, which Rawls finds in "a
constitution resembling that of the United States ...honored as a pact to
maintain civil peace," one does "not have stability for the right reasons, that
is, as secured by a firm allegiance to a democratic society's political (moral)
ideals and values." 89 Tolerance therefore is not a sufficient ground rule for
conviviality of citizens.
Modus vivendi thus fails as the ultimate constitutional argument.
Equally insufficient to the democratic ideal is the individual's identification
with a group as a be-all and end-all component of society. Democracy is not
ensured either in the second example adduced by Rawls: "Nor again do we
87
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have stability for the right reasons in the second example-a democratic
society where citizens accept as political (moral) principles the substantive
constitutional clauses that ensure religious, political, and civil liberties,
when their allegiance to these constitutional principles is so limited that
none is willing to see his or her religious or nonreligious doctrine losing
ground in influence and numbers, and such citizens are prepared to resist or
to disobey laws that they think undermine their positions."90
Rarely has the "demographic threat" in Israeli, Iraqi, or Lebanese
societies been more clearly depicted in philosophical terms. The demographic argument, which attaches to communities fearing the loss of their
numerical majority, is deafening in the Middle East. "Here again, democracy is accepted conditionally and not for the right reasons," 91 which is the
equality of individuals coming together as transcendental citizens, that is as
citizens moved by a moral law which is superior to their communitarian
belonging, and even to the morality that may derive from their religion.
Rawls states: "What these examples have in common is that society is divided into separate groups, each of which has its own fundamental interest
distinct from and opposed to the interests of the other groups and for which
it is prepared to resist or to violate legitimate democratic law. In the first
example, it is the interest of a religion in establishing its hegemony, while in
the second, it is the doctrine's fundamental interest in maintaining a certain
degree of success and influence for its own view, either religious or nonreligious. While a constitutional regime can fully ensure rights and liberties for
all permissible doctrines, and therefore protect our freedom and security, a
democracy necessarily requires that, as one equal citizen among others,
each of us accept the obligations of legitimate law., 92 The conclusion is a
damning verdict for any Middle Eastern-style democracy: "While no one is
expected to put his or her religious or nonreligious doctrine in danger, we
must each give up forever the hope of changing the constitution so as to
establish our religion's hegemony, or of qualifying our obligations so as to
ensure its influence and success. To retain such hopes and aims would be
inconsistent
with the idea of equal basic liberties for all free and equal citi93
zens."
Powerful as the conclusion may be, we think it may not be a decisive indictment if the religious belonging of the individual, which forms in
much of the Middle East a defining bond to his and her community, is perceived in a different mould. This mould is typically constitutional, and suggests that in the same way majoritarianism gets trumped in democracies by
90
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the federal principle, as well as by the role of courts and government in acknowledging and defending "discrete and insular minorities," some constitutional arrangement can, even must be sought, to accommodate that pervasive communitarian trait of Middle Eastern societies.
The issue described as personal versus territorial may be prospectively put in terms of communitarian versus territorial federalism. Three
pressing constitutional examples at the beginning of the twenty-first century
illustrate the difficulties that result.
Lebanon is a useful start, whose population is divided more or less
evenly between its Christian and Muslim components. We have described
the Lebanese constitution in the previous section. Let us now examine more
closely its structural characteristic, derogatorily known as sectarianism or
communitarianism, confessionalisme in French, ta 'ifiyya in Arabic. 94 Lebanese constitutionalism recognises that the relationship between the citizen
and the state is not an immediate, direct one. The relationship-or allegiance-is filtered by his or her community, in the case of Lebanon one of
the eighteen or so sects that make up the country, resulting in a complicated
realm of combinations simplified by an overarching line separating, in law,
Muslims and Christians, and by the sometimes no less powerful separation
between Muslim Sunnis, Muslim Shi'is, and Christian Maronites, the three
larger communities in the country. While shocking to the equality of citizens as individuals, this complex sociological-constitutional situation is
better approached positively, and somewhat approximately, as "communitarian" (or personal) federalism. Communitarian privilege derives from the
personal scheme looking up to the shari'aas a millennium-guiding model,
such pattern no doubt an old Middle Eastern characteristic harking back to
whenever religion became the nexus of the individual's relation to the
community: a person is Muslim, or Christian, or Jewish, before she is Lebanese, French, or Saudi. In his great work on 10th to 13th century
Egypt,
95
Goitein describes that model as "medieval religious democracy."
However frustrating to the Western constitutionalist, one should approach that feature positively: like Egypt or Morocco in the classical age,
the Lebanese system is not an all-bad system, and people who sneer at it
may see in the worldwide debate over the post-Ba'th Iraqi Constitution why
94 It tends to appear in political science literature under the denomination "consociational-
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they should reconsider. It is a correct assumption, widely held and full of
merit, that matters of governance in Iraq cannot be stable or fair, if the
Sunni community is not represented in the decision-making process. This,
actually, is the Lebanese constitutional litmus test: however 'low' a community may rank, it will retain, under the Lebanese Constitution, representation
in government. Nor is this trait exclusively Lebanese. Its Middle Eastern
roots are deep, and so recognised elegantly by Karl Marx, for whom the
puzzling nature of Near or Middle Eastern history is that "it always takes
the appearanceof religion.' 96
The persistent Lebanese constitutional model offers a wide
archetype which replicates the personal as opposed to the territorial model
in the rest of the region. It may not be out of place to conjure up PalestineIsrael as a negative counterexample, namely that a discrete and insular,
historically victimised minority of Israeli Arabs, representing a fifth of the
population, has never had serious executive representation in Israel's
government. Under a Lebanese-like model, non-Jewish Israelis would be
entitled to a fifth or a quarter of cabinet posts. The legal protection and
representation of the indigenous Palestinian (defined as Christian or Muslim
by the Jewish majority) community, which stands at the root of a conflict
over a century old, is not different from the primary constitutional definition
of Lebanese citizens as Christian or Muslim, of Iraqis as Shi'is or Sunnis,
except that the definition in Israel is about who is a Jew and who isn't. In
the legal and sociological study of Israel, Jewishness is granted to be the
exclusive characteristic of the country, in the same way as 'Muslim-ness'
would be emphasised in Iran or Pakistan. Because of the historic legacy of
the Holocaust, this is an issue which is overwhelmingly seen as the be-all
and the end-all of Israel as a state.
Over a period of fifty years, with remnants of the debate still current
for the latest waves of immigration, Ethiopian and Russian, the central question for law in Israel was about "who is Jewish?" For Christians and Muslims directly affected by the emergence of Israel, they are by definition outside the legal order of a state defined by its Jewishness. This structural discrimination is seen in the three strands of victimisation of non-Jews since
1948: for those who were evicted from their homes and never allowed to
return, they simply do not exist in the eyes of Israeli law. These are the
refugees of 1948, defined by Israeli law as perpetual and irrevocable "absentees." For those who came in 1967 under occupation, a four-decade long
domination coupled with slow and relentless expropriation of land hemmed
them in an evernarrowing territory. For the one-tenth of the native population that was not evicted in 1948, and which grew to become about a million
96
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souls at the turn of the twenty-first century, the Israeli Arabs as they are
called-the Palestinian Israelis as they could be more scientifically depicted-the Jewishness of the State of Israel has meant that their constitutional participation, at the bottom, was made available by an absolute right
to vote, but that executive representation at the top remained tightly constrained by a combination of harsh legal rules and by overt discrimination
against their participation in government or in the judiciary.
One understands now better Lebanon's deeper constitutional structures as defining a counter-constitutional model to the one dominant in the
West since Montesquieu and the FederalistPapers. In the spring of 2001,
drafts of the 1926 Lebanese Constitution were released, and they are sobering. 97 Two texts stand in open contradiction: Article 7 of the would-be constitution, and Article 95. In Article 7, like any other country, all citizens are
declared equal. In Article 95, the communities must be respected as legal
agents or intermediaries for those very citizens. As we saw in the previous
section, this has not changed almost a century later, except that the current
Article 95 has established parity between Christians and Muslims in Parliament, away from a multiple of the original formula (six Christians to five
Muslim MPs) that prevailed until the so-called Ta'if Agreement in 1989.
It would be wrong to think the retrospective view stops at 1926. The
earliest extant prototype of Lebanese constitutionalism, a text that goes back
to 1836, established municipal councils, that is representation and executive
power, in the major cities (then Sidon and less prominently Beirut), on the
98
basis of parity between the number of Christian and Muslim councilmen.
By any historical measure, parity in representation between Muslims and
Christians from 1836 to the 21st century is a deep structure, but that model
is further entrenched in the so-called Ottoman Millet system, itself rooted in
the medieval religious democracy so learnedly documented by Goitein, and
possibly by legal calques of public law that go back much further in time.
To simply jettison it under the name of individual equality, however the
merit of the approach, may be unwarranted, if at all feasible.
On this complex and difficult legacy a new debate has taken place,
with the concept of federalism in its midst. Federalism, in the constitutional
concepts available to human thought, stands ahead of the traditionally centralised nation-state, and Middle Eastern national systems are increasingly
97
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challenged by the example of such diverse countries as the United States,
Germany, Nigeria or Malaysia where the federal model is common constitutional ground. 99
The problem is that federalism, in any system that constitutional
lawyers recognise on the planet, is inevitably territorial. With federalism
following territory, and history, one has Rhode Island's and California's
representatives co-existing happily in the U.S. Senate as equals.
California takes the revenge of numbers over Rhode Island in other
ways, but the territorial model remains the rule. When it comes to the executive branch, the majority of votes tend to bring the person chosen by the
majority of people to the Presidency, with Californians and Rhode Islanders
counting almost equally at the polls.
Here appear the many difficulties of constitutionalism beyond the
sociological set-up in Lebanon, Iraq, Israel, the Middle East, and North Africa generally, where the principle of full equality between two citizens
within the country is at stake. Federalism, to be meaningful, is forced to
give way to corrective representation of communities standing in lieu of
states, and this is a non-territorial scheme by-and-large.
Nor is the scheme easy to implement. Populations are interwoven,
people move about, and while there may be majorities, often dominant, in a
given territory, cities and the urban trend which has become a universal
sociological trait by the end of the twentieth century blur that alleged racial,
religious, or national cohesion. Rarely if ever is there territorial "purity,"
and the absence of real or imagined cohesion entrenches the problem: communitarian federalism requires territories which are homogenous. They are
not readily available in most of the Muslim world, and when they are, may
result from forms of ethnic cleansing which no one wishes to consecrate in
law. Even when such territories appear to be homogenous, the problem gets
translated on their borders, as one can see at the turn of the 21" t century in
Kirkuk between Arab and Kurdish Iraqis, in Baghdad between Sunnis and
Shi'is, in Jerusalem between Jews and non-Jews (or Israelis and Palestinians), or in Beirut and its suburbs between Shi'i and non-Shi'i Lebanese.
The central problem for federalism, in Iraq, Lebanon or Israel, is
also thornier than elsewhere in the world, since the issue tends not to be
separation of powers in the three executive branches of government, but the
fight in the centre over executive power. Executive power is a difficult puzzle by nature, as Robespierre saw it two hundred years ago: one cannot have
executive power if one has only part of it. A democratic system believes in
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the exercise by the individual citizen of his or her free choice to cast a vote
for an executive chief eventually chosen by the majority.
There is no readily available answer to that conundrum, and various
forward arrangements are being examined and tested, as in the presidential
triumvirate of Iraq that emerged in 2004.100 Such schemes tend to become
bewildering and unduly complex for the pervasive quotas they encourage,
and multi-religious and multi-ethnic mosaics cloud one's moral principles
on the basic equality amongst citizens. The problem remains: to put the issue in simple words, the individual's allegiance in the Middle East, including Israel and Lebanon, is dual in law. He or she operates nationally, as a
constitutional citizen in a Habermas way. But he or she also relates to public
affairs through his or her religious or sectarian affiliation, which makes the
community a constitutional agent recognised in law. That fault line is hard
to bridge, and new constitutional formulas may be needed that bring together not only the dilemma identified in this section, between the personal
and the territorial, but also the two other constitutional conundrums discussed earlier: (a) how does a federal system acknowledge communities on
the other side of the border-for instance for Kurdish Iraqis their folk in
Syria, Iran or Turkey, and even communities who do not live in adjacent
states, for instance Lebanese Shi'is vis-t-vis their sister communities in Iraq
or Iran; and (b) how will the classic pillars of constitutional democracy,
popular and competitive choice of leaders, separation of powers, and judicial or constitutional review operate in such a system?
For the Middle Eastern world, bringing citizenship and community
allegiances together into one working framework is the challenge of constitutionalism for the twenty-first century. Meanwhile, the clash between the
two legal logics of personality and territoriality remains daunting, and it is
against the pulls and pushes that they force onto the world system that constitutional law must be assessed inside each Middle Eastern jurisdiction.
V. EPILOGUE

No doubt the search for transnational accommodation continues in
the Middle East, but the nation-state remains the essential framework for
constitutional law. With the possible exception of Yemen and the United
Arab Emirates, formal transnational unions have failed. It may be that the
new economic and informational networks on the level of the planet have
started to undermine the dominance of the nation-state, but it will be some
time before Middle Eastern legal and judicial institutions accommodate the
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international process hazily adumbrated as "globalisation." Meanwhile, the
example of neighbours keeps weighing heavily on the domestic developments in each country, for better and for worse. In 1992, the halt of constitutional democratisation in Algeria froze a similar process in the whole of
Arab Africa, whilst successful elections and the assertion of judicial independence and effectiveness anywhere in the Middle East are envied by
neighbouring populations and feared by the ruling potentates who are naturally concerned that the constitution would bring constraints on their own
overbearing powers.
At the same time, the debate on the Islamic tradition accommodating democratic mechanisms persists, with two alternative poles: the collapse
into chaos if the accommodation is blunted or prevented on the one end of
the spectrum-as in Algeria or Afghanistan under the Taliban; on the other
end, the slow emergence of movements having at heart the recurrence of
free elections in their societies to choose their leader and, as importantly, to
change him. The prevalence of one trend over the other is not easy to predict, but the battle is joined, with factors of density of civil society, domestic, regional and international power politics, and neighbourhood examples
pulling on constitutional law in several directions at once.
Unanswered remains the question of personal, as against territorial
law, which affects the Middle East in the arguably most significant challenge of constitutional law since Montesquieu. With the constitutional entrenchment of communities defined on the basis of religion, and even sect,
the communitarian model openly espoused in the Lebanese constitutional
system appears increasingly as a dominant model for countries in which
minorities seek representation over and above basic majority rule. The conflict between personal and territorial models of constitutional conviviality is
joined. If history is to be the guide, it will not be solved soon.
Within this larger challenge, the question about compatibility or incompatibility between a world civilization-Islam, and a political systemdemocracy, is better avoided. Emergence of Muslim-democrat movements
across the Islamic world, like in Turkey in the 1990s, helps bring a soothing
perspective on the red herring argument of Islam's intrinsic incompatibility
with democracy. Such movements need to be appraised in each country, in
the same way as other nationalist or otherwise based political groupings,
against the activities of governments when in opposition and, when in
power, for their own activities with respect to recurrent and meaningful
elections, the texture of civil society, and the protection of the individual's
basic rights.
Constitutional law plays itself out also in the judicial "mirror" of
civil society, with courts being constantly curtailed by executive power, and
judges, lawyers, and the society at large fighting to enhance an independent
and meaningful judiciary as the main factor of civilised stability. In the absence of the realisation of the independence and integrity of the judicial
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process as the neutral terrain for the resolution of social problems, the whole
constitutional process is left to "civil society" in sheer opposition to the
state. In that case, the state finds itself in a situation where legality precludes
legitimacy. In that case indeed, where the protection of human rights is left
to "civil society," constitutions get emptied of any significance. Judges are
part of the state as a matter of course, and it is as the third branch of govemnment, including for their normally exclusive access to the Weberian
"monopoly of violence," that they should first and foremost be approached
for the proper appreciation of constitutional law. They are its ultimate defenders. The slow emergence of judicial constitutional review is a novelty in
the Middle East, and one needs to assess it in far more detail.'0 '
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